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It is trite law that a policeman whose duty it is
to inquire into alleged offences has the right to
question persons likely to be able to give him in-
formation. The earlier English cases however made
a sharp distinction between the right of a police
officer to question a person when he was merely
conducting an investigation and his right to ques-
tion a person whom he had already taken into
custody or had decided to charge.
In R. v. Knight and Thayre,1 Channel, J., said:
"It is, I think, clear that a police officer or
anyone whose duty it is to inquire into alleged
offences as this witness here, may question
persons likely to be able to give him informa-
tion, and that, whether he suspects them or not,
provided he has not already made up his mind
to take them into custody. When he has taken
anyone into custody and also before doing so
when he has already decided to make a charge,
he ought not to question the prisoner. A magis-
trate or judge cannot do it and a police officer
certainly has no more right to do so. I am not
aware of any distinct rule of evidence, that if
such improper questions are asked the answers
to them are inadmissible, but there is clear
authority for saying that the Judge at the trial
may in his discretion refuse to allow the answer
to be given in evidence and in my opinion that
is the right course to pursue."
The person questioned however had a common
law right to keep silent and not incriminate him-
self.2 The Canadian courts however from a very
early time have uniformly held that a statement
made by an accused, if made voluntarily, is ad-
* Member of the Bars of British Columbia and On-
tario with offices in Toronto. Additional biographical
data may be found in 51 J. Ciums. L., C. & P.S. 161(1960).-EuiToR.
1 20 Cox C.C. 713 (1905).2
"Section 110 is clearly dn invasion of the common
law right of a subject to remain silent lest he incriminate
himself." Stewart, J in Greathead v. Newcastle, 107
Can. C.C. 363, 366 ?1954).
missible notwithstanding that it is made while in
custody in answer to questions put by the police.3
The Supreme Court of Canada in Boudreau v.
The King' held that such statements are admissible
if made voluntarily in the sense that that term is
used by Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. The King5
where the principle is stated as follows:
"It has long been established as a positive
rule of English criminal law, that no statement
by an accused is admissible in evidence against
him unless it is shewn by the prosecution to
have been a voluntary statement in the sense
that it has not been obtained from him either
by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage ex-
ercised or held out by a person in authority."
There was however a considerable body of
authority prior to the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada in: Boudreau v. The King, supra,
that as a matter of law a statement made by an
accused in answer to questions by the police in
circumstances where he was either in actual
custody or where the police had made up their
mind to charge him was not admissible unless the
statement was preceded by a warning that he was
not obliged to answer.
In Gach v. The King6, Taschereau, J., speaking
for the majority of the court said:
"There is no doubt that when a person had
been arrested, all confessions made to a person
in authority, as a result of questioning, are
inadmissible in evidence unless proper caution
3R. v. Elliott, 3 Can. C.C. 95 (1899); R. v. Day,
20 O.R. 209 (1890).
494 Can. C.C. 1 (1949).
5[19141 A.C. 599, 609.
6 11943] S.C.R. 250, 254, 79 Can. C.C. 221, 225.
See also Sankey v. The King, 48 Can. C.C. 97: "It
should always be borne in mind that while, on the one
hand questioning of the accused by the police, if prop-
erly conducted and after warning duly given, will not
per se render his statement inadmissible, on the other
hand, th& burden of establishing to the satisfaction of
the Court that anything in the nature of a confession
procured from the accused while under arrest was
voluntary always rests with the Crown." Per Anglin,
C. J. C., at p. 101.
G. ARTHUR MARTIN
has been given. This rule which is found in
Canadian and British law is based on the sound
principle that confessions must be free from
fear, and not inspired by a hope of advantage
which an accused may expect from a person in
authority."
The present position is authoritatively stated
in the judgment of Kerwin, J. (now C. J. C.), in the
Boudreau case as follows -
"The mere fact that a warning was given is
not necessarily decisive in favour of admissi-
bility but, on the other hand, the absence of a
warning should not bind the hands of the Court
so as to compel it to rule out a statement. All
the surrounding circumstances must be in-
vestigated and, if upon their review the Court
is not satisfied of the voluntary nature of the
admission, the statement will be rejected. Ac-
cordingly, the presence or absence of a warning
will be a factor and, in many cases an important
one."
Mr. Justice Rand, in his judgment in the
Boudreau case, recognizes the competing interests
of effective police investigation of crime on the
one hand and the protection from abuse of power
on the other:
"No doubt arrest and the presence of officers
tend to arouse apprehension which a warning
may or may not suffice to remove, and the rule
is directed against the danger of improperly in-
stigated or induced or coerced admissions. It is
the doubt cast on the truth of the statement
arising from the circumstances in which it is
made that gives rise to the rule. What the state-
ment should be is that of a man free in volition
from the compulsions or inducements of au-
thority and what is sought is assurance that that
is the case. The underlying and controlling ques-
tion that remains: Is the statement freely and
voluntarily made? Here the trial judge has found
that it was. It would be a serious error to place
the ordinary modes of investigation of crime in
a straight-jacket of artificial rules; and the true
protection against improper interrogation or
any kind of pressure or inducement is to leave
the broad question to the Court. Rigid formulas
can be both meaningless to the weakling and
absurd to the sophisticated or hardened criminal;
and to introduce a new rite as an inflexible pre-
liminary condition would serve no genuine in-
terest of the accused and but add an unreal
7 Boudreau v. The King, 94 Can. C.C. 1, 3 (1949).
formalism to that vital branch of the adminis-
tration of justice.
"I do not mean to imply any right on the
part of the officers to interrogate or to give
countenance of approval to the practice; I
leave it as it is, a circumstance frequently pre-
sented to Courts which is balanced between a
virtually inevitable tendency and the danger of
abuse."
8
The burden of proving to the satisfaction of the
trial judge that a statement made by the accused
was voluntarilymade in the above sense is upon the
Crown.9 When a statement is tendered the trial
judge holds a "trial within a trial" or as it is com-
monly called a voire dire in the absence of the jury.
If the prosecution discharges the onus of proving
that it was made voluntarily the statement is ad-
mitted in evidence. The weight to be attached to a
statement admitted as voluntary is for the jury.
If the Crown does not discharge the onus of proving
it was made voluntarily the statement is ruled in-
admissible and no more is heard of it.
The length of time over which questioning is
conducted and the manner in which it is carried
out are relevant factors in the subsequent de-
termination of the voluntary nature of a confession.
In R. v. HowlettI° the Ontario Court of Appeal
quashed the conviction of the accused because the
only evidence consisted of a statement which the
Court held had been obtained by police interroga-
tion of a coercive nature over a three hour period.
In the more recent case of R. v. Nye" the same
court held that a statement made by appellant
was made voluntarily although appellant had been
questioned at intervals by the police over a period
of about twelve hours while in custody. The court
held that throughout this period no improper in-
ducement had been held out to the accused to make
a statement nor was she threatened in any way. In
R. v. Fitton 2 the Supreme Court of Canada on ap-
peal by the Crown reversed the judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal ruling inadmissible a
statement made by the accused because in the
opinion of that court it was obtained by questions
put by police officers that were in the nature of
cross-examination in that the questions of the
police had suggested that several items in an
earlier statement made by accused were false.
8 Id. at 8.
I R. v. Thompson, [1893] 2 Q.B. 12, 17 Cox C.C. 641.
10 [1950] O.R. 181, 96 Can. C.C. 182.
" 122 Can. C.C. 1 (1958).
12 [19561 S.C.R. 958, 116 Can. C.C. 1.
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Rand, J., said:
"Questions without intimidating or suggestive
overtones are inescapable from police enquiry;
and put as they were here, they cannot by them-
selves be taken to invalidate the response given.
The question still remains: was the statement
made through fear or hope induced by au-
thority?"' 3
It would appear from the recent decisions that
the courts are taking a more liberal attitude than
heretofore with respect to lengthy police interroga-
tion providing that the questions are not such as
to imply a threat.' 4 The Canadian courts have not
adopted a hard and fast rule that a statement made
during a period of detention that is illegal is neces-
sarily inadmissible. It is a circumstance and a
cogent circumstance to be considered, and no
doubt illegal detention of the accused, unless
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution, would
raise a strong presumption that a statement made
during that period was obtained by duress.
In CCapddaine v. The King"s the Quebec Court
of Appeal rejected a statement made by accused
where the circumstances were such as to indicate
that the police had held the accused incom-
municado for the purpose of inducing her to make
a confession of guilt. The Court said:
"The duty of the officers was to bring this
woman to Court within a reasonable delay. They
had no authority to keep her incommunicaa,
whether she asked for a lawyer or not. It is ob-
vious that the purpose of this incarceration was
to create suspense in the mind of the accused,
which could undermine a stronger mind than
hers. It is true that she was not otherwise ill-
treated but a display of kindness with, at times,
a show of authority and usurped power, in such
an environment, which amounted part of the
time to solitary confinement was not without
its effect-and this was sought.
"It is a remarkable coincidence that the ac-
cused was allowed to see a solicitor the day she
signed a confession. Before that, she was not
seen by friends or relatives, though they had
come to headquarters."
An accused who has been arrested on a criminal
charge has the right to retain counsel immediately,
and any interference with this right by the police
would suggest an improper purpose in so doing
13 116 Can. C.C. at 6.
"4But cf., the judgment of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in R. v. Eaton, 117 Can. C.C. 375(1957).
s 72 Can. C.C. 209, 211-12 (1933).
which would cast doubt on the voluntary nature of
a statement subsequently made by the prisoner."
The prisoner should not be denied his right to
communicate with his relatives. 7
it must be borne in mind that in Canada prose-
cuting counsel does not take part in the investiga-
tion of crime except in an advisory capacity to the
police. The courts have laid it down on more than
one occasion that it is the duty of prosecuting
counsel to present fairly and dispassionately all the
credible evidence that is available to the Court
whether the evidence is for or against the accused.' 8
In R. v. Chamandy9 Mr. justice Riddell, speaking
for the Ontario Court of Appeal, said:
"It cannot be made too clear, that in our law, a
criminal prosecution is not a contest between in-
dividuals, nor is it a contest between the Crown
endeavouring to convict and the accused en-
deavouring to be acquitted; but it is an in-
vestigation that should be conducted without
feeling or animus on the part of the prosecution,
with the single view of determining the truth."
16 R. v. Dick, 87 Can. C.C. 101, 112 (1947).
"The suggestion that any detective or other police
officer is justified in preventing or attempting to prevent
a prisoner from conferring with his counsel is a most
shocking one. The suggestion that counsel, if he is
permitted to confer with his client who is in custody,
might thereby obstruct the police in the discharge of
their duties is even more shocking. The prisoner is not
obliged to say anything and the lawyer is entitled to
advise him of that right. The lawyer is an officer of the
Court and it is the function of the courts to administerjustice according to the law. To prevent an officer of
the Court from conferring with the prisoner who in
due course may appear before it, violates a right of the
prisoner which is fundamental to our system for the
administration of justice." (Per the report of the
Honourable Mr. justice Roach of the Ontario Court
of Appeal sitting as aCommissioner appointed by the
Attorney-General under §46 of the Policx AcT,
R-S.O. 1950, c. 279, to investigate a complaint made
against the conduct of the police.)
'7 "There is one further matter that deserves com-
ment. A person who has been arrested should not be
held incommunicado. We do not find it necessary to
find as a fact that the infant plaintiff was denied his
right to communicate with his father at the first reason-
able opportunity. If, however, the father of the infant
plaintiff was refused permission by the Sergeant of
Police to see his son at any time before the charge
came on for hearing in Court, such practice cannot be
justified in this or in any other case. A person in cus-
tody should never be denied his right to communicate
with his relatives at the earliest reasonable opportunity
so that he may avail himself of their advice and assist-
ance. That right ought to be recognized and given effect
in all cases, and care should be exercised by police
authorities to see that it is not wholly disregarded."
Koechiin v. Waugh .4 Hamilton, [1957] O.W.N. 245,
249.
"8 Lemay v. The King, [1952] S.C.R. 232, 102 Can.
C.C. 263; Boucher v. The King, [1957] S.C.R. 16, 110
Can. C.C. 263.





Americans who feel dissatisfaction with certain
methods of police questioning sometimes look at
the English Judges' Rules to see if there is any
lesson to be learned from them. Perhaps there is a
lesson, though not one that appears on the surface.
The Judges' Rules were originally formulated
in 1912, with additions in 1915, and an important
interpretation in 1930. Although the Rules are
nine in number, the gist of them may be stated
in two propositions.
1. When a police officer has made up his mind
to charge a person with a crime, he should caution
him in the usual words: "Do you wish to say
anything in answer to the charge? You are not
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so,
but whatever you say will be taken down in
writing and may be given in evidence."
2. A person in custody must not be questioned.
Violation of these rules confers a discretion on
the judge to exclude from evidence a statement
made by the accused.
The Caution
The first rule is not a serious impediment to
the police. When the police question a suspect,
he is usually ready to answer their questions in
order to try to assuage their suspicions. They
need not administer the caution until they have
obtained sufficiently incriminating statements to
satisfy them of guilt. But even if the caution is
uttered before this point, it will not usually in-
hibit replies. When the police officer has persis-
tently questioned a suspect, thus bringing him to
the point where he is ready to make a statement,
the utterance of the caution is unlikely to alter
matters.
The requirement of the caution pays lip service
to the doctrine that an accused person has a right
to silence, while not effectively safeguarding that
right. Let us imagine what form of words would be
needed if criminals were really to be advised of
the best mode of exercise of their privilege. A
policeman would have to say to every possible
* Reader in English Law in the University of Cam-
bridge and a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge.
Additional biographical data may be found in 51 J.
Cn m. L., C. & P.S. 166 (1960).-IEmTOR.
culprit (not merely to a person who had already
doomed himself by replies to questions): "You
need not reply to my enquiries, and in your own
interest you should consult a lawyer before
answering any of them." This warning has only
to be phrased to make apparent its incompatibility
with the successful performance of the functions
of the police.
The Rule Against Questioning in Custody
The other rule, against questioning in custody,
does not clearly appear from the Judges' Rules as
they were formulated in 1915. Indeed, Rule 3
states that "persons in custody should not be
questioned without the usual caution being ad-
ministered" which seems to imply that if the
caution is administered, questioning is permissible.
However, some judges even before 1915 had ex-
cluded statements obtained by interrogation in
custody, whether upon caution or not. The true
intent of the Judges' Rules was finally settled by
a police circular issued by the Home Secretary
with the approval of the judges in 1930. The cir-
cular states:
"His Majesty's Judges have advised as
follows:-Rule (3) was never intended to
encourage or authorise the questioning or
cross-examination of a person in custody after
he has been cautioned, on the subject of the
crime for which he is in custody, and long before
this Rule was formulated, and since, it has been
the practice of the Judge not to allow any
answer to a question so improperly put to be
given in evidence."
The Practice of the Police
This interpretation may now be said to be a
dead letter. Notwithstanding the circular, the
police still interrogate persons in custody, and
the judges admit the resulting confessions in
evidence.
These facts are not generally acknowledged in
England, and need to be demonstrated in slightly
more detail. As an illustration, take the incident
related by Mr. G. H. HatheriJI in an address to the
Royal Empire Society. Since Mr. Hatherill bore
the impressive title "Commander (Crime)"
at Scotland Yard, and told the story with some
[Vol. 52
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pride as an example of. police practices, it may
be taken as a confession by the police of what
they do. Early on Christmas Day, 1944, a young
woman was found murdered at Dagenham. Mr.
Hatherill sent out his detectives to bring in to the
police station the dead girl's young men-six or
seven-with orders not to tell them why they
were to go there but to note their behaviour.
"Having all been torn away from their Christmas
dinners, all but one of them wanted to pull down
the police station. The odd man raised no difficul-
ties, and when asked to get into the car said:
'I shall have a ride, anyway.' He eventually
confessed to the murder."
Action of this type could be accounted efficient
and proper police work if each suspect were given
to understand that he was accompanying the
police freely. However, it was doubtless part of
the ruse in this instance, as in sundry others, to
give each suspect the impression that he was
under compulsion, in order to frighten him into
confessing if he were the real culprit. Such action
undoubtedly constitutes a false imprisonment.
Sir Ronald Howe, who was formerly a Deputy
Commissioner at Scotland Yard, wrote that "the
Judges' Rules are so much a part of the detective's
training that it is a very rare thing for him to
disregard them." But Sir Ronald had just stated
his opinion that according to the Rules "a man
taken into custody may not be questioned at all
until [a] caution has been administered."' This
is the wording of Rule 3, but it has long been
known to contain a misleading implication. As
was pointed out before, according to the inter-
pretation adopted by the judges in 1930, Rule 3
was never intended to encourage or authorise
the questioning or cross-examination of a person
in custody after he had been cautioned.
Later in his article, the author gave details of
the methods used by the police in questioning
those whom they had "pulled in" on suspicion of
crime. They will give the suspect a nice, strong
cup of tea with plenty of sugar in it, express
sympathy for his plight, and try by every means
to get his confidence. "Most suspects, especially
those new to the game or being questioned about
a serious crime like murder, are only too eager to
confide in somebody, and if the questioning police-
man shows himself a decent chap, anxious to be
fair, he will quite often be the confidant." It
1 See Sir Ronald Howe's article in John Bull, March 8,
1958.
seems evident from the reference to the "question-
ing policeman" .that the Home Secretary's circular
of 1930 is regarded as a dead letter.
The way in which the police behave when they
think the circumstances require it is illustrated
by the case of Rowland in 1946. Rowland was
suspected of murder, and was awakened at 11 p.m.
by two police officers who told him to get up and
dress. He was told that an inspector wanted to.
see him at the police station. He was taken to
the police station and arrived there at 11:30 p.m.
According to the evidence of the police themselves,
he was questioned for two hours, and then had his.
statement taken down dnd signed, which took
forty minutes; this would have meant that Rows.
land got to bed, in the police station, at ten
minutes past two in the morning. Only after he
had made his statement was he charged with
anything. According to Rowland's own evidence,
the period of questioning was substantially longer.
There can be no doubt that this action by the
police was illegal. English law knows no "de-
tention for questioning" short of arrest, and the
act of taking Rowland to the police station with-
out his consent was an illegal arrest because the
reason for it was not stated at the time. It is
surprising that, when Rowland was put on trial,
his statement made in answer to the improper
questioning was admitted in evidence without
comment from the presiding judge or even protest
from his own counsel.
The Attitude of the Judges
These and other instances indicate that de-
tention for questioning, and questioning after
arrest, are still practised by some police forces,
without serious check. To add to the anomaly, it
seems from the reported cases that the judges
have given up enforcing their own rules, for it is
no longer the practice to exclude evidence obtained
by questioning in custody. In 1930, when the
judges' opinions were reported in the Home
Secretary's circular, it was broadly true that the
custom of the judges was not to allow any answer
to questions addressed to a person in custody to
be given in evidence. Earlier, in Voisin, the Court
of Criminal Appeal had laid it down as a general
principle that the confession was admissible
though obtained as a result of questioning in
custody; but a judge might exclude it in the
particular case on grounds of unfairness. There-
after the judicial attitude toughened, and between
GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS
the wars the general practice was to exclude the
confession; but since about 1950 they have almost
uniformly been admitted.2
Our toleration of this situation in England raises
serious doubts of our bona fides in prohibiting
police interrogation of persons seriously suspected
of crime. Thurman Arnold showed, in a penetrating
and amusing. study, that the criminal process
embodies conflicting values, and he concluded
that "the public administration of criminal justice
is not a method of controlling crime. It is rather
one of those problems which must be faced by
those who desire to control crime." 3 So likewise
with the ban on interrogation by the police. A
traditional principle of "fairness" to criminals,
which has quite possibly lost some of the reason
for its existence, is maintained in words while it is
disregarded in fact. When judges both assert that
the police should discipline themselves, and yet
admit evidence that has been obtained by lack of
the judicially-imposed discipline, the stultification
of our professions becomes patent.
AnoumNrs IN PAVOUR o ALLOWiNG THE
POLICE TO DETAIN FOR QUESTIONING
The reader may be expecting at this point,
from the pen of an English lawyer, a vigorous
denunciation of the police and of the judges, and
a plea for a return to the Judges' Rules as inter-
preted in 1930. What ought to be considered,
however, is whether these Rules are a workable
part of the machinery of justice. Perhaps the
truth is that the Rules have been abandoned, by
tacit consent, just because they are an unreason-
able restriction upon activities of the police in
bringing criminals to book.
Take the facts in Voisin,4 one of the first cases
after the formulation of the Judges' Rules where
the Rules were in effect ignored by both the police
and the judges. The accused had been detained
for questioning by the police on suspicion of
murder, but the police had not at that time
decided to charge him with the crime. (Indeed,
others were detained on the same suspicion, though
subsequently released.) As part of the ques-
tioning, the police asked the accused if he would
have any objection to writing down the two
2 See May, 36 Cr. App. R. 91 (1952); Wattam, 36
Cr. App. R. 72 (1952); Bass, [19531 1 Q.B. 680; Joyce,
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 140; and compare Mills, [1947] K.B.
297.
3 THE SymBoLs OF GOVERNMENT c.6 (1935).
4 [1918] 1 K.B. 531.
words "Bloody Belgian." He replied, "Not at all,"
and then wrote down "Bladie Belgiam." These
words were his death-warrant, for the body of
the murdered woman had had a label attached to
it with the two words spelt in the same way
as the accused now spelt them. The trial judge
admitted the evidence, notwithstanding that the
accused had not been cautioned and was in cus-
tody at the time; and the Court of Criminal Appeal
affirmed the conviction.
From every point of view except the legal one,
the action of the police in this case was perfectly
proper. It is true that a number of innocent per-
sons were subjected to the inconvenience of de-
tention in the police station for questioning, but
this was surely a lesser evil than that a dangerous
murderer should be left at large in society. The
request addressed to Voisin was not likely to entrap
an innocent man; on the contrary, it gave the
accused an opportunity of convincing the police
of his innocence, if he were innocent, for then his
handwriting and spelling would have been differ-
ent from the writing on the label.
In the same way, the action of the police in the
case related by Mr. Hatherill was socially justified.
It may be, in retrospect, a source of mortification
that one has missed one's Christmas dinner, and
an even greater misfortune that six men should
have missed their Christmas dinners. But the
evil is infinitely less than that a murderer should
go free.
This same incident seems to show the need
for some power of detention for evidentiary pur-
poses on reasonable suspicion, distinct from the
power 'of arrest. It is true that, in many cases, the
police are able to act effectively without powers
of detention. They may interrogate a suspect in
his house, with his reluctant consent, or they may
prevail upon him to attend for questioning in the
police station. But these methods are not always
adequate. A common method of solving crime is
to use the modus operandi index and compile a list
of all criminals who are known to use the methods
employed in committing the crime under inves-
tigation; the list is then narrowed by excluding all
those who for one reason or another could not
have been responsible-as where they do not
correspond with the description given by wit-
nesses, or can produce a satisfactory alibi. The
process frequently leaves a number of suspects.
A witness may be shown photographs of these
suspects, and he may pick out one, who is then
[Voi. 52
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put in an identification parade; if he is identified
as the criminal, there may be sufficient evidence
to charge him. Suppose, however, that the witness
cannot make up his mind between two photo-
graphs? The police may wish to bring in the two
suspects to stand in identification parades, but
it seems clear that the law of arrest is unsuitable
to achieve this end. An arrest supposes that a
charge is made and that the accused will be
br6ught before a magistrate as the first step in
legal proceedings. But it would be improper to
bring a man before a magistrate merely with the
evidence that either he or someone else committed
the crime. The machinery of arrest is inappropriate
until suspicion has been focussed on a single
person.
It may be conceded that hardship may be caused
to persons who have previously been convicted
of crime if they are subject to detention and police
interrogation merely because some one else has
committed a crime by a similar method. A former
criminal who is now trying to lead an honest life
may have his new career gravely jeopardised by
such action on the part of the police. Thus a power
of detention for questioning would certainly need
to be used with wisdom and restraint. But this
is not necessarily a reason for withholding the
power from the police altogether. It should, of
course, be limited to crimes of some gravity, and
also subject to a limit of duration, and other
safeguards to be suggested presently.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY
English lawyers tend to regard it as axiomatic
that the police should not interrogate persons in
custody, and they rarely enquire into the reason
for the prohibition. Historically, it seems to have
owed its origin to the indignation caused by
judicial inquisition in political cases.
The King's Council of the seventeenth century
provided a striking parallel with the secret police
of modem tyrannies. It had its spies in every
locality; it arrested and imprisoned persons on
the slightest suspicion; and it issued orders to
justices of the peace who interrogated suspects
under torture.5 These excesses of governmental
power burnt into the racial memory of the Anglo-
American peoples. It was by way of reaction
against them, as well as against the general
severity of the criminal law, that the opinion came
5 NIcHoLAs, PROCEEDINGS AND ORDINANCES OF THE
PRIvY COUNcI. xlvi-xlvii, 129 (1837).
to be accepted in the early years of the nineteenth
century that a magistrate should not interrogate
an accused person. In 1848, this self-restraint was
translated into law.
During the course of the nineteenth century,
judges assumed that what was forbidden to the
magistrate as a judicial officer was also forbidden
to the police, and occasionally they excluded
evidence obtained by the questioning of suspects
in custody. But there is no compulsion about
this logic, for the considerations of policy are
different. It may be indecorous for a judge to
question an accused person, and it may offend our
sense of fairness to send an accused person to
prison for refusing to answer incriminating ques-
tions; but neither of these issues is involved in
questioning by the police.
The rule against police questioning cannot be
explained by saying that such questioning may
result in untrue confessions, for it can sometimes
be demonstrated that the confession is true. Where
the confession discloses details of the crime which
bnly the criminal could have known, its authentic-
ity. is beyond doubt; yet some judges have ex-
cluded such a confession if it was the result of
questioning by the police.
A possible argument against the questioning of
prisoners is that the possession of this power tempts
the police to do their job in an unsatisfactory way.
One of the remarkable features of police practice
in England, which impresses Continental observers,
is the short space of time that is allowed to elapse
between the arrest of an offender and his appear-
ance in court and subsequent trial. Whereas, in
many European countries, a defendant may
languish in prison for as much as a year without
trial,6 this would be unheard of in England. The
6 See, for France and Belgium, the instances given
by ENSOR, CouRTs AND JUDGES 35 (1933); DENNING,
FREEDOM UNDER =rr LAw 10 (1949). Dr. Otto John was
kept in custody in West Germany for nearly eleven
months before the opening of his trial on November 12,
1956. These prolonged detentions are especially signifi-
cant when combined with police interrogation. Cardinal
Mindszenty, who was tried before the People's Court
in Budapest in 1949, put in a formal plea which stated
that he had been interrogated in custody and in court
for 40 days. Pastor Dinov, who was eventually ac-
quitted by a People's Court in Sofia in 1949, was ques-
tioned for two months in prison, sometimes by a single
questioner, sometimes by teams. Torture is not neces-
sary to procure confessions if unlimited and practically
unceasing questioning is permitted, for no ordinary
person can stand it, especially when the prisoner has his
resistance lowered by lack of warmth, lack of food, and
lack of sleep, and is compelled to remain standing dur-
ing the questioning. Mr. Stypulkowski, who wrote his
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reason sometimes suggested is that the English
police generally build up their evidence before
making the arrest, so that very shortly after
making the arrest they are ready with their evi-
dence in court. On the Continent, the tendency is
to arrest the suspect as the first step, in order to
interrogate him; and the interrogation may be
continued for weeks or months. Nevertheless, the
abuses of Continental procedure are not a neces-
sary element in police questioning. Under English
law, the police only have a few hours in which to
question the arrested suspect before bringing him
before a magistrate. Even if the principle were
conceded that the police may properly question a
person in custody, a short time-limit would obvi-
ously. be placed upon such questioning in order to
avoid prolonged detention without trial.
Perhaps the real reason why we in England are
afraid to allow the police to question persons
accused of crime is that we fear the very efficiency
of the proceeding. Few criminals can remain com-
pletely silent under persistent questioning; and if
they answer, they are likely to give themselves
away, if only by making statements which can be
disproved, or statements which are inconsistent
with a defence afterwards set up for them at the
trial. A considerable number will confess. Sir
Patrick Devlin in his Sherrill Lectures pointed to
the remarkable proportion of confessions among
those convicted of homosexuality between con-
senting adults-94 percent-where apart from the
confession it would often have been extremely
difficult to convict. He pointed out that in
Scotland, where the judges are more active in
preventing police questioning, only one person
out of nine convicted of homosexuality made a
written admission.7 One may well feel that the
practice of prosecuting homosexual acts between
adults is mistaken, but that has nothing to do with
the general question whether the police should be
allowed to use efficient methods for enforcing the
law.
A strict ban on interrogating persons in custody
would place a strain upon the self-restraint of the
police. The duty of the police is to detect criminals,
and they are generally allowed to address questions
experiences in his book INvITATIoN To Moscow (1951),
had to endure 141 examinations, of which some lasted
for fourteen hours at a time. See also BECK & GODIN,
RUSSIAN PURGE AND THE ExTRAcTioN OF CONFESSION
(1951).
7 DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND
58-59 (1958).
to every quarter where they hope to obtain infor-
mation. It may seem strange that they should be
supposed not to ask questions of the one person
who is central to the whole investigation. To tie
the hands of the police on a "sporting theory of
justice" has a debilitating effect upon morale. As
Sir Ronald Howe has said, "it is essential to effec-
tive police action that the police should be con-
vinced that, when they have spent many hard
days and nights tracking a suspect down, he should
be properly dealt with." This consideration would
seem to suggest a modification of the Judges'
Rules, or of their interpretation, to allow some
questioning in custody.
It must also be remembered that when the
preliminary enquiry comes to be held, the prosecu-
tion will be forced to come out into the open with
the details of its case against the accused. This is
as it should be, for it would not be right for the
accused to be taken by surprise at the trial. Yet
there is no apparent unfairness in trying to obtain
certain information from the accused before the
preliminary enquiry, while he is still in the dark
about the details of the prosecution's case. After
the" enquiry, the accused will be able to adjust
his tale to fit the known facts.
For these important reasons, a complete prohibi-
tion of the questioning of those who are strongly
suspected is difficult to enforce against the police,
and, if it were strictly enforced, might breed a
dangerous attitude of cynicism. The police may
well ask themselves whether society can be so
interested in the conviction of offenders, if it with-
holds from the officers of the law one of the most
potent means (and often the only means) of ob-
taining the evidence necessary for a conviction.
But, it may be said, the arguments for allowing
the police to question a suspect do not justify
them in taking him to the police station, where
he feels himself to be isolated and at their mercy.
Why should not the police do their questioning in
the suspect's own home, before arresting him?
This would certainly be the better practice
wherever possible, even though it may not be so
likely a way of securing a confession. Yet there
are occasions when questioning, if it is to be done
at all, must be done in custody. Where the crime
is a grave one, and the suspicion already strong
it may not be safe to leave the suspect unarrested.
Or the matter on which the accused is questioned
may not have come to the knowledge of the police
until after he has been arrested. Or, again, the
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accused may be in custody on one charge, when
it is desired to interview him on another.
THE MEcLNIcAL RECORDING
OF CONFESSIONS
The trend of the foregoing argument is that
questioning in custody is an essential part of police
investigation where the author of a crime cannot
otherwise be detected, and, consequently, that it
should be legalised and at the same time controlled.
At the moment, English Judges maintain in theory
an idealist rule, while conniving at police practices
which-set it at defiance.
One point needing attention is the possibility of
providing for the mechanical recording of confes-
sions. The present practice is for a statement to be
written out either by the accused or by the police
officer and signed by the accused. But a confession
is admissible in evidence even though it has not
been reduced to writing, or even though the
accused withholds his signature, provided that the
judge holds that it was properly obtained. In such
circumstances there is likely to be a collision of
evidence between the accused and the police as to
what exactly the accused said. Often there will
have been no shorthand note of an interview with
the defendant in which he is alleged to have ad-
mitted guilt, and the court will have to make up
its mind between the two versions of what passed.
Where two police officers have interrogated the
accused, the practice, approved both judicially
and by the Home Office, is for the two officers to
consult together after the interview when preparing
their notes of what was said. 8 They may even
prepare a joint note.9 But it is strongly argued
that this is unfair to the accused, since, instead of
possibly three versions of the actual words used,
the two police officers are ranged solidly upon one
side of the fence, and the accused upon the other.'0
Even where the statement is reduced to writing
and signed by the defendant, the position is by
no means satisfactory, because the statement does
not show the questions by which particular answers
were prompted. When an answer is obtained to a
question, the question is not recorded separately
in the written statement, but is embodied in the
answer, though the wording was that of the inter-
rogating officer and not that of the accused. If a
8 Bass, [1953] 1 Q.B. 680; Home Secretary's circular
to Chief Constables, No. 172/54, dated August 30,
1954.
9 DLTxvN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 50.
'OR. Kenneth Cooke in [1954] CRn L. Rnv. 833.
leading question elicits a monosyllabic answer, it
may be subtly misleading to write the result as
though the statement implied in the question
emanated from the accused.
These difficulties could be obviated if the in-
terview were tape-recorded, so that the court of
trial could, in case of challenge, ascertain precisely
what the accused said. It is true that tapes can be
tampered with, but this danger could be met by
requiring the tape to be sealed by the accused
person and deposited for transcription with an
officer of the court.
Probably the most serious difficulty in the way
of the proposal is that the police may fear that the
presence or suspected presence of a recording
inftrument will inhibit the answers of suspected
persons. A similar fear explains why the police,
in interviewing a suspected person, do -not write
down his answers at the time; they do not want to
let the suspect realise that he is dictating evidence
against himself. Perhaps the difficulty would be
met if it were standard practice for the police, in
interviewing any witness in connection with sus-
pected crime, to carry a little attach6 case which,
placed- in an inconspicuous position, would record
the conversation without drawing too much atten-
tion to itself. If this were a generally known and
accepted part of police practice, it might not ex-
ercise too damping an effect upon investigations,
and it would add greatly to the reliability of any
evidence that results. At any rate, when the ac-
cused person is ready to make a statement there
would geem to be little difficulty in recording his
voice; and this is already done in Israel in the case
of all major crimes.
SAFEGUARDInG AGAINST ABUSES
The practice of interrogation by the police is
certainly open to the possibility of abuse. The
police, convinced that they have got the right man,
may sometimes regard themselves as morally
justified in extorting a confession in order to keep
an evil-doer under lock and key. The interrogation.
may be accompanied by promises or threats which
would render the confession inadmissible if they
could be proved in court, but which are after-
wards denied by the officers concerned. A defend-
ant is in a peculiarly weak position when he makes
allegations of this kind against the police. The
word of two officers, whose character appears to
be above suspicion, will almost always be preferred
to that of a person accused of crime. Yet it is
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known that some policemnen are dishonourable,
and policemen ate occasionally found in the courts
to have given false evidence.
It is sometimes suggested that an accused person
should be entitled to see his lawyer before
answering any questions by the police, and indeed
that he should have a right to the presence of his
lawyer during questioning. This would certainly
operate as a substantial safeguard against illegality,
but there is one fact that makes it impracticable.
As soon as a lawyer is introduced on the scene, he
advises his client to answer no questions. Thus if
a lawyer were admitted the wholeproceeding would
be stultified. In Voisin, for example, it would
quite possibly have resulted in the acquittal of a
dangerous murderer, for a legal adviser would not
have allowed Voisin to write the fatal words.
From the lawyer's point of view, the advice he
gives his client to refuse a statement is reasonable.
Not knowing the evidence in the hands of the
police, it would be highly dangerous to the defence
to allow the accused to be questioned.
The defending lawyer's job is to befriend his
client and (subject to a few overriding restrictions
imposed by professional ethics) to give him the
best advice in his own interest. The lawyer is
entitled to assume the innocence of his client when
all appearances are against him. It has been the
experience of centuries that this arrangement is
necessary to protect the innocent and to redress
the lack of balance between the power of the State
and that of the subject. As part of his function,
the defending counsel will make full use of the rule
that an accused person need not answer until a
prima facie case has been established against
him-and even then is obliged to answer only in
the sense that he is put under the practical neces-
sity of defending himself. We look upon this rule
as an important part of the protection.given by
law to the liberty, dignity and privacy of the
subject, notwithstanding that this sometimes
makes the task of the prosecution harder. Still,
considerations of liberty, dignity, and privacy
must give way to some extent to the practical
necessities of law enforcement, and for this reason
it is necessary to maintain the present position
under which a person who is in the custody of the
police has no legal right to have his lawyer present
while he is making a statement. The Royal Com-
mission on Police Powers and Procedure recom-
mended that in cases where the attendance of
friends and legal advisers is open to no objection,
the deponent should always be offered the option
of having them present. But it seems that in
practice the police invariably take the view that
the presence of an outsider is open to objection.
For the same reason, it would be impracticable
to require that the questioning of a person in
custody should take place in the presence of a
magistrate. Such a proceeding would be regarded
as judicial, and there would be an irresistible
demand that the accused should be given the right
to legal representation and advice. Besides, the
English police technique of friendliness and cups
of tea could hardly be used to produce confessions
if there had to be a formal hearing before a magis-
trate. From the point of view of the police, the
most effective interrogation is one conducted in
privacy.
It would, however, be a step towards preventing
possible abuses if the accused were removed from
the custody of the police. Only long familiarity
causes us to accept without surprise the arrange-
ment under which a suspect is placed in the ab-
solute power of those whose duty it is to obtain
evidence against him. Consider: we employ police
to investigate crime, and expect them to attain a
measure of success in the apprehension and convic-
tion of criminals; at the same time, we allow those
who are arrested to remain for a time in the custody
of the police themselves. The result can be seen
in cases like Rowland, which was discussed above,
where interrogation of the suspect went on far
into the night. The situation is a particularly
dangerous one where the crime charged is that of
an attack on a policeman, for here the esprit de
corps of the Force is aroused, and the police are
tempted to exceed proper limits.
The conclusion is that where a local jail is avail-
able, it should be made a rule that persons arrested
should be lodged forthwith in this jail rather than
in a police cell. This would mean that the physical
safety of the accused person would be the respon-
sibility of a different set of officials from the police.
The police could be given a reasonable opportunity
to question the accused in private in the prison,
but the door would have the usual grid through
which a prison warder might occasionally look.
Thus the accused person would have some feeling
of security against possible illegal violence on the
part of the police, and the trustworthiness of
confessions would be increased. The arrangement
would also be to the advantage of the police
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because they could more easily refute charges of
impropriety.
Whatever may be thought of these particular
suggestions, there can hardly be any doubt that
the general subject of questioning by the police
needs to be reconsidered in the light of present
needs and present practices. So long as there is
pressure upon the police to keep down the rate of
crime, they are likely to ignore restrictions which
they feel to be unreasonable.
C. France
ROBERT .VOUIN*
According to the French penal procedure, the
police may interrogate an arrested person, in the
case of a crime or a flagrant delict, prior to taking
him before the Public Prosecutor.1
Apart from the case of a flagrant delict, a pre-
paratory inquiry may be opened on request of
either the Public Prosecutor or the victim of the
offence. In this case, the examining magistrate can
issue against the accused person: (1) a summons
or mere invitation to appear freely before the
judge; (2) a warrant or an order given to the public
forces to bring the accused person before a judge;
(3) a committal order for the head-watchman of
the jail to receive the accused person; or (4) a
warrant for arrest, an order given to the public
forces to identify and arrest an escaped accused,
in order to take him to jail.2 Irrespective of the
nature of the warrant delivered against the accused,
he cannot be interrogated by the police. But the
examining magistrate, in the process of the
preliminary investigation, may give rogatory com-
missions to the police ("commissions rogatoires"),
that is to say, may entrust a judicial police officer
with the responsibility of assuming a certain part
of the inquiry; however, the interrogation of the
accused cannot be included in such commissions.3
By virtue of this situation, a person may be heard
by a judicial police officer as a witness, before
being brought before the judge to be indicted.
Thus, in France, a person may be heard or
interrogated by a judicial police officer before
being brought before a magistrate ("Procureur de
la R6publique" or "Juge d'Instruction") in two
situations: (1) in the case of a person who has been
* Professor of Criminal Law, Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Paris. Additional biographical data may be
found in 51 J. Ci i. L., C. & P.S. 169 (1960).-
EDITOR.
I CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE (hereinafter C.P.P.),
arts. 63, 64.
2 C.P.P., art. 122.
3 C.P.P., arts. 81, 151, 152.
heard first as a witness by a judicial police officer,
on a rogatory commission from a judge; (2) in the
case of a person arrested in a case of a crime or a
flagrant delict. In both cases, the French law grants
an effective guarantee to the person who has been
heard or interrogated in this manner by the judicial
policer officer, but this guarantee is not always
the same.
In France, the suspected person enjoys an
effective protection as soon as he is brought before -
the examining magistrate as an accused. From
that time, actually, he is not only excused from
taking an oath to tell the truth, but also he may
require the help of a barrister. The latter must be
convoked by the judge to every interrogatory,
permitted to study the briefing, and allowed to
communicate freely with his client any time he
desires.4 As theseprotections do not facilitate their
task, the examining magistrate and the police
might be tempted to put off their application,
delaying as long as possible the time when the
suspected person is the object of a formal inculpa-
tion. But the jurisprudence has reacted against
this trend by formulating a rule that, the Penal
Procedure Code has just adopted.
According to Article 105 of this Code, "the
examining magistrate in charge of a preliminary
investigation, as well as the magistrates and the
judicial police officers acting upon a rogatory
commission, cannot (otherwise it would not be
valid) hear as witnesses persons against whom
serious and concordant incriminating evidences
exist, when this hearing would result in eluding
the defence guarantees."
Thus, when a judicial police officer hears a
person as a witness, upon a rogatory commission,
and when serious and concordant incriminating
evidence appear against this person, he must
immediatly put an end to this person's interroga-
4 C.P.P., arts. 114, 118.
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tory, because the latter, liable to be incriminated,
cannot be interrogated from then on but by the
magistrate, and must be brought before him at
once.
Actually the whole difficulty lies in knowing
what must be understood by "serious and con-
cordant incriminating indicia," and the policemen
affirm that this difficulty is not unsubstantial. But
it is always possible for the judicial police officer,
when he has discovered incriminating indicia which
seem to him "serious and concordant" to bring
the matter to the judge. Besides, the jurisprudence
specifies what we must understand by these indicia
by stating, for instance, that the inculpation could
sometimes be delayed, as in the Dominici case, 5
even though, in the Fesch case, the preliminary
investigation procedure was declared null and
void because it was delayed too long.6
Several kinds of persons may be delayed for
24 hours at the disposal of the judicial police
officer who is in charge of the inquiry, in case of a
crime or a flagrant delict. But only the persons
against whom serious and concordant incriminating
indicia exist may be kept on a close watch for 24
additional hours, upon the decision of the "Pro-
cureur de la R~publique." Now, any person kept
on a close watch, in case of a crime or a flagrant
delict, may be interrogated by the judicial police
officer within the 24 hours allowed. At the end of
the time allowed, the person must be discharged or
brought before the "Procureur de la R~publique."
The result is that, in the preliminary investiga-
tion for a crime or a flagrant delict, a person may
be interrogated by the judicial police officer during
two periods of 24 hours each, even if serious and
concordant incriminating indicia exist againt him.
This solution, opposed to the solution of the Article
105 of the same Code, may be explained by the
special nature of the crime or the flagrant delict,
which allows and even demands a specially fast
procedure, in which the certainty of guiltiness
makes possible a restriction of the guarantees
granted to the defence.
Thus, if it is asked what limitation may be
supplied to the right of the police to interrogate
an arrested person before bringing him before the
competent magistrate, the French law supplies
the question with two different answers. It does
not limit the delay for this interrogatory to a
reasonable time; it does. not prescribe to reduce
it in order to help any useless slowness. The French
law, depending on the cases, prescribes to put an
6 Cass. Crim., Sem. Jurid. 1954.11.8351 (1954).6 Cass. Crim., Sem. Jurid. 1955.11.8851 (1955).
end to the police interrogatory, either when serious
and concordant incriminating indicia are disclosed
against the interrogated person, or when this
person has been delayed against his will for 24 or
48 hours. And these two different solutions seem
equally justified.
Because of certain abuses of the police investiga-
tion, the question had been raised in France
whether the assistance of a barrister should be
permitted to a suspected person as early as his
police interrogatory and prior to any actual judicial
procedure. The new Penal Procedure Code has
admitted this assistance to the suspected person
by a defence counsel during the prehearing period
only under very strict conditions.
According to the Code, in the case of a flagrant
crime, the "Procureur de la R6publique" may
summon a warrant against any person suspected
of having participated in the offence. He inter-
rogates at once the person who is thus brought
before him, and this person "if he reports himself,.
accompanied by a defence counsel,... may be
interrogated only in the presence of the latter." 7
This procedure, according to the text, applies
only "if the matter has not been referred to the
examining magistrate yet." But it concerns an
interrogatory by the "Procureur de la R~publique"
and not by a judicial police officer. The assistance
of a defence counsel during the interrogatory is a
privilege granted to the suspected person who
spontaneously reports himself before the magis-
trate. But this privilege is granted to this person
only if his spontaneous appearance is the conse-
quence of a warrant summoned against him.
We can see that this assistance is very limited.
Defence counsel (barristers) do not ask for it to be
extended, because they don't care to assist their
clients during the police phase of the procedure.
Actually, it is still too early, the Code being in
force only since March 2, 1959, to say what an
institution which has not had a chance to prove
itself yet is worth.
If a person suspected of having committed a
crime was delayed by the police during an illegal
extended period and if, during the illegal extension
of the delay, he confessed he was the author of the
crime, it is certain his confession could not be
considered as a proof of the crime and should be
set aside in the proceedings in court. As a matter
of fact, the proof is free in France, on the under-
standing it has been legally secured and legally
brough forward in court.
7 C.P.P., art. 70.
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D. Germany
WALTER R. CLEMENS*
INTERROGATION OF THE SUSPECT BY THE POLICE
SUBSEQUENT TO IIIS PRELIMINARY
ARREST
Under Section 163 of the German Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called CCP), the
police are bound to investigate criminal offenses
and take all measures that permit of no delay,
with a view to preventing collusion in the case.
Within the scope of this duty they are authorized
to make a preliminary arrest of suspects, provided
requirements of Section 127(i) or (ii), CCP,1 are
complied with.
However, the right to a deprivation of liberty
effected by the police is subject to limitations, as
well as a review by the judge, according to the
provisions of Article 104 of the Basic Law for the
Federal Republic dated May 23, 1949,2 and Section
128, CCP, supplementing and implementing the
provisions of the Basic Law.
3
* Head Officer, Ministry of Justice, State of Ham-
burg, Germany. Additional biographical data may be
found in 51 J. Cr. L., C. & P.S. 172 (1960).
1 This provision is set forth in full in Clemens, Police
Detention and Arrest Privileges (Germany), 51 3. Cam.
L., C. & P.S. 421, 422 (1960).
2 It reads as follows:
"(i) The freedom of the individual may be restricted
only on the basis of a formal law and only with due
regard to the forms prescribed therein. Detained per-
sons may be subjected neither to mental nor physical
ill-treatment.
"(ii) Only a judge is entitled to decide on the admis-
sibility and extension of a deprivation of liberty. In
the case of any such deprivation which is not based on
the order of a judge, a judicial decision must be ob-
tained without delay. The police may, on their own
authority, hold no one in their own custody beyond
the end of the day following the arrest. Further details
are to be regulated by the law.
"(iii) Any person temporarily arrested on the sus-
picion of having committed a punishable act must, at
the latest on the day following the apprehension, be
brought before a judge who shall inform him of the
reason for the arrest, interrogate him, and give him an
opportunity to raise objections. The judgemust, with-
out delay, either issue a warrant of arrest, setting out
the reasons therefor, or order the release.
"(iv) A relative of the person arrested or a person
enjoying his confidence must be notified without delay
of any judicial decision ordering or extending the dep-
rivation of liberty."
3 The latter provision reads as follows:
"(i) The preliminarily arrested person, unless set free
at once, shall without delay, at the latest on the day
following the apprehension, be brought before the judge
(Amtsrichter) who has jurisdiction in the district where
the apprehension took place; he shall inform him about
Within the time-limit between the arrest by the
police of the suspect and the date when he must
be brought before the judge under Section 128,
CCP, the police may collect evidence of every
description and, in particular, interrogate him.
This authorization stems from their duty, imposed
upon them under Section 163, CCP, to investigate
offenses. Naturally, such questioning of the pre-
liminarily detained person can turn out to be
detrimental to him. On the other hand, it can be
advantageous, because under Section 128(i), CCP,
the police are authorized to release him, which
they are always bound and prepared to do, if the
evidence gleaned by them, and in particular the
interrogation of the arrestee, has rebutted the
strong suspicion prevailing against him.
The suspect can defeat his interrogation by the
police (as well as by the prosecutor or judge) by
taking advantage of his privilege of silence, con-
ceded to him under Section 136, CCP.4
To begin with, the right of the police'to inter-
rogate the suspect subsequent to his preliminary
arrest is subject to certain restrictions as regards
the mode of interrogation. Section 136a, CCP,5
which is binding on the judge, the district attorney,
and the police at all stages of the proceedings,
prohibits certain methods of interrogation deter-
mined to be immoral.
This provision-which incidentally applies also
to the hearing of witnesses according to Section
the reasons for the arrest, examine him and give him
an opportunity to raise objections.
"(ii) If the judge holds the arrest not to be justified
or its reasons no longer existent, then he orders the
release. Otherwise he will issue a warrant of arrest."
4 See Clemens, The Privilege Against Sdf-Incrimina-
lion (Germany), 51 J. Ctni. L., C. & P.S. 17.2, 172-73
(1960).
5This provision reads as follows:
"(i) The freedom of determination and manifesta-
tion of the defendant's will shall not be impaired
through ill-treatment, fatigue, subjecting to bodily
trespass, application of drugs, through torturing, de-
ceiving, or hypnosis. Coercion may only be used to the
extent permitted by the Criminal Procedure Statute.
Threats with any measure outlawed under its provisions
and the promise of any advantage not provided for by
the law is prohibited.
"(ii) Measures impairing the memory or discernment
of the defendant are not allowed.
"(ii) The prohibitiong enacted in paras. -(i) and (ii)
are binding regardless of the consent of the defendant.
Statements obtained in violation of this prohibition
must not be used in evidence, not even with the con-
sent of the defendant."
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69(iii), CCP-was inserted in the CCP through an
amendment in 1950.6
Prior to 1950 the CCP, originating in the year
1877, contained no provisions outlawing certain
methods of interrogation. Such provisions appeared
to be unnecessary, because the law presupposed as
a matter of course that the German judges, public
prosecutors, and police officers would refrain from
dubious interrogation methods.
The sad experiences during the time of the Nazi
regime (1933 to 1945), in the course of which the
use of force and other disreputable methods was
quite common, in particular during interrogations
to which the suspect had to subject himself before
the police, justly demanded that a recurrence of
such disgraceful happenings should be banned by
the provisions of Section 136a, CCP.
It must be emphasized that this provision con-
tains not only a prohibition against specific inter-
rogation methods, but also an unequivocal prohibi-
tion against using in evidence statements of the
defendant which were obtained in violation of the
first-mentioned prohibition. The ban on the use
of such evidence applies even in the event that
the defendant has given his consent.
It might be of interest that Section 136a, CCP,
has received a broad interpretation on the part of
the courts and the law professors. Thus the German
Federal Supreme Court7 and part of the legal
teaching professions have taken the view that
obtaining a statement from the suspect through
the use of a so-called "lie detector" falls under the
ban of Section 136a(i), CCP, and that such a
statement cannot, under Section 136a(iii), be used
in evidence. The Bavarian Supreme Court 9 goes
even farther. In a judgment rendered in 1951 it
held:
"It does not appear out of place to interpret
6 Art. 3, No. 51 des Gesetzes zur Wiederherstellung
der Rechtseinheit auf dem Gebiet der Gerichtsverfas-
sung, der Biirgerlichen Rechtspflege, des Strafverfahrens
und des Kostenrechts vom 12 Sept. 1950 (Art. 3, No. 51
of the Law dated September 12, 1950, on the Restora-
tion of Legal Unity in the Field of Court Constitution,
Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice and Law
Costs).
7 5 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 333 ( Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court
in Criminal Matters).
s For instance: KLEI xNECHT-MbLLER, KOmENTAR
ZUR STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG (Commentary on the CCP)
§136(a) n.3(c) (4th ed.) and EBERaRD ScnmT,
LEmzKomNTAR ZUR STRAYPROZESSODNUNO (In-
structional Commentary of the German Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure) pt. II, §136(a) n.9 (1957).
9 Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Obersten Landes-
gerichts in Strafsachen (Decisions of the Bavarian
Supreme Court in criminal matters) 460 (1951).
the provision of Section 136a, CCP, as the legal
manifestation of the will of the law-maker going
beyond the wording of the statute to rule out
in a trial the use of evidence obtained through
immwral means."
Also any wilful violation of Section 136a (i and ii),
CCP, is punishable under Section 343 Criminal
Code, which deals with the extortion of statements.
Moreover, the right of the police to interrogate
the suspect subsequent to his preliminary arrest is
subject to certain time limits. These are laid down
in Section 128(i), CCP, which says that the ar-
restee must be brought before the judge without
delay ("unverziiglich"), at the latest on the day
following his preliminary arrest. This provision is
the result of an amendment made in 1950.10 The
former text of this provision merely required the
"bringing of the arrestee before the judge without
delay," without providing for a specific time limit.
This statutory phrase gave rise to a dispute which
persisted for some decades as regards the interpre-
tation of the term "without delay." The police,
following a dubious practice, used to interpret
this term as entitling them to detain the arrestee
as long as appeared necessary to them for the
purpose of gleaning the complete incriminating
evidence. Grave objections were justly raised
against such practice. In 1922 they culminated
in a judgment rendered by the Frankfort/Main
Appellate Court" which interpreted the words
"without delay" to mean that the appearance
before the judge had to take place at the latest
on the day following the apprehension, and that
a prolonged delay for the purpose of procuring
further evidence was improper.
Also the Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the
former Deutsche Reich) rendered a decision in
1932,12 in which it said that as a rule the bringing
of a preliminarily arrested person before the judge
must take place at the latest on the day following
the apprehension. During the period subsequent
to 1933 this decision was open to strong criticism.
A report by the Chief of the Berlin Criminal Police
which appeared in 19341-that means at the
10 Art. 3, No. 50 of the Law dated September 12,
1950. For complete citation to Law, see note six, supra.
1 Jutisniscn Woc=Nscmu-r (Weekly Law
Journal) 1058 (1922).
12 135 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivil-
sachen 161 (Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Civil
Matters).
13 Quoted in KAuFkANN, DER PouizEmicHE Em-
oRrF m FREIHEIrEN m RECHTE (The Police En-
croachment upon Liberties and Rights) 78 (Frankfort/
Main 1951).
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beginning of the Nazi regime-denounced the
decision as completely out of place, and went on
to say
"that an end had to be put to the excessive
esteem of individualistic interests, and neglect
of collectivistic interests which had carried fatal
irresolution into the ranks of the police, ham-
stringing many of them in the impetus of the
first action. Not only had the constitutional
protection of the right of liberty to be taken
into account, but much the more so the state's
general interest in the interpretation of the
words 'without delay.' For this very reason the
arrestee would often have to put up with a
police detention in excess of the 24-hours limit.
On this a dear legal rule must be demanded."
In spite of this criticism the predominating police
practice subsequently adhered to the decision of
the Reichsgericht. However, the conflict of opinions
on the interpretation of the words "without delay"
did not come to an end until after the new phrasing
of Section 128, CCP, in 1950.
For the purposes of an interrogation (or the
collection of other evidence), the police, according
to the present wording of Section 128(i), CCP,
may detain a suspect arrested by them at the
latest until the expiration of the day following
his apprehension, whereupon he shall be brought
before the appropriate judge. In the event his
interrogation (or the collection of other evidence)
has already been finished prior to that time, he
shall be brought before the judge even earlier,
that is, immediately upon completion of the
inquiries. The infraction of these rules will con-
stitute an illegal deprivation of liberty.
Going beyond the time-limit laid down in the
law is not permitted, not even with the consent
of the arrestee. 4
It may be emphasized that the police ,are not
entitled to detain the defendant on any ground
whatsoever if he was arrested on the strength of a
judicial warrant. In such case they are obligated,
as is prescribed by Section 114(b), CCP, to take
him before the judge "without delay," at the
latest during the day following his apprehension,
without being authorized, according to the pre-
vailing and correct opinion, to delay.the commit-
ment by procuring evidence, or interrogating the
arrestee. Neither are the police authorized to
release the arrestee, because his arrest had not
been ordered by them, but by the judge.
14 See UNEcr-MILLER, op. cit. supra note 8,
at §128 n.3.
THE! DEFENSE OF TnE SUPECT DURING TiE
PERELT INARY PROCEEpINGS
Section 137, CCP, provides that at any stage of
the proceedings-which includes/the police or dis-
trict attorney's investigations- the suspect can
avail himself of the aid of'a defense counsel. The
latter's communication with the arrested defend-
ant, however, is subject to certain limitations,
laid down in Section 148, CCP, which reads:
"(i) Written and oral /Communication with
counsel is permitted to the arrested defendant.
"(ii) As long as the court case is not opened
the judge may refuse Written communications,
if he is not permitted to lo6k into them.
"(iii) Until the same moment the judge, unless
the arrest is based only on danger of escape,
can order the talks with counsel to take place
in his presence or the presence either of a deputy
or of a commissioned judge ......
Hence, the arrestee can confer with counsel orally
or in writing prior to his first police interrogation.
He can defeat the restrictions laid down in Section
148(ii) and (iii), CCP, by taking advantage of his
privilege of silence, conceded to him under Section
136, CCP.
Furthermore, counsel is in principle not entitled
to attend the interrogation by the police or prose-
cution of either the defendant or other persons.
Pursuant to Section 147, CCP, however, counsel
(and counsel alone; the defendant has no such
right) is entitled to the inspection of the minutes
of the district attorney and the police regarding
the interrogation of the defendant and the opinion§
of the experts. Such right is granted him even
during the initial stages of the investigation.
These far-reaching restrictions imposed upon
counsel have met with vehement criticism in
Germany of late. At the German Lawyer's Meeting
in May, 1959, the president of the Federal Supreme
Court supported this criticism by saying:15
"I agree that the position of counsel is too weak
in our Code of Procedure, and that it must be
built up strongly. Especially during the prie-
liminary proceedings counsel will have to take
a more active part, and no doubt his status as a
whole will have to be raised.... That counsel
may attend at the police interrogation, that he
is supposed to attend at the prosecutor's inter-
rogation, that he is allowed to ask questions,
all this ... I think is a matter of course."
There is good reason for entertaining hopes that
very soon the position of counsel for the defense
"I ANWALTSBLAT" (Lawyers' News) 209 (1959).
1961
WALTER R. CLEMENS
during the preliminary proceedings will be con-
siderably fortified by way of an amendment of the
law, and especially that he will be granted the
right to be present at the police and district
attorney's interrogations of his client, the wit-
nesses and the experts, and to communicate with
the defendant at any stage of the procedure with-
out any supervision on the part of the judge or
other persons.
In German criminal procedure it is counsel's
function to help the defendant by having .him
exonerated, that means in the first place to obtain
his acquittal or, if not, a sentence which is as
lenient as possible. He is prohibited from acting to
his client's detrimerit. In other words, he holds
a one-sided party position. The public prosecution,
on the other hand, is under German law an
authority which is bound to be impartial. They
will, therefore, ascertain under Section 160(ii),
CCP, not only all incriminating, but also all
exonerating and mitigating circumstances. Section
296(ii), CCP, even goes as far as entitling the
public prosecution to make appeals and other
remedies under the law in favor of the defendant.
Such rights and duties of counsel and prosecution
prevail at all stages of the criminal proceedings,
hence also during the preliminary proceedings.
As the district attorney is the sole master of the
preliminary proceedings (that means the proceed-
ings prior to the presentation of the written charge
to the trial judge), the part played by counsel for
the defense can only be relatively restricted during
this stage of the proceedings. Heinrich Henkel, 6
Professor of Criminal Law at the University of
Hamburg, has rightly pictured that part as follows:
"In regard to his investigation-activities
counsel is limited to submitting the exonerating
material which has come to his knowledge, to
the public prosecutor. He is not entitled to
make his own investigations running parallel
to those of the public prosecutor.
"The dividing line which must be drawn
between the preparing and assisting activities
of counsel on one hand, and the investigation-
activities of the public prosecutor on the other
hand, can, it is true, hardly be ascertained in
general terms; here the merits of the individual
case must prevail, and the various objectives
of the parties must be considered, at all events,
16 STRAFVERARNSRECHr (Law of Criminal Pro-
cedure) 211 (1953).
however, the sole and exclusive responsibility
of the public prosecutor for this stage of the
proceedings. Certainly, counsel may not only
accept enlightenment in the matter (through
the defendant, his relations and friends), but
also inquire who might be a witness to the facts.
However, as a rule he is not permitted to ques-
tion witnesses, as the latter would mean an
encroachment upon the investigating activities
of the public prosecutor, and might possibly
expose counsel to the suspicion of influencing
witnesses within the meaning of Section 159,
160 of the German Criminal Code."
The position of counsel during the course of the
preliminary proceedings, as set out, appears to be
too weak. It should be fortified considerably by
way of a change of the law.
UTILIZATION OF A CONFESSION MADE
BY THE DEFENDANT DURING HIS
ILLEGAL PRELIMINARY
POLICE DETENTION
As was mentioned above, the police may interro-
gate the defendant, preliminarily detained by
them, without delay, at the latest until midnight
of the day following the apprehension. A confession
made to the police by the defendant at a moment
subsequent to this time-limit has therefore been
brought about in violation of statutory provisions.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that
the judge is prevented from using it as evidence.
This will occur only if the statute prohibits the
use of such evidence.
While there is in the CCP no prohibition against
using as evidence a confession which the defendant
made to the police after the expiration of the
time-limit provided for in Section 128, CCP, such
confession can in principle be used with the quali-
fication that the judge, within the scope of the
free evaluation of evidence (Section 261, CCP),
can refrain from using it17 in an individual case.
The legal position is different in a case where the
confession was brought about through i-treat-
ment, fatiguing or similar illegal devices. The
above-mentioned statutory prohibition under
Section 136a, CCP against using the evidence
applies to such a case.
17 This matter will be dealt with in a report concern-
ing "The Exclusionary Rule with Respect to Illegally
Seized Evidence" which will appear subsequently in
this JouRNAL.
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CONCLUSION
In the light of the foregoing observations the
three questions posed for discussion in connection
with this topics can be answered as follows:
(1) Under German law the police are authorized
to interrogate a preliminarily detained suspect at
the latest until the end of the day following his
apprehension. This provision is satisfying and has
not given rise to objections.
The commitment-limit provided for in Section
128, CCP, does not appear to be too long, and
there is as yet no need for shortening it, which
indeed cannot be recommended, because by doing
so the police would in many instances have no
sufficient chance to clear up the facts to such
extent as would enable the judge, once the arrestee
has been brought before him, to make his decision
forthwith, without being compelled to make further
inquiries himself as to whether a warrant of arrest
appears necessary. There is no need either for
prolonging the above-mentioned time-limit.
In comparison to a statute providing that the
is The questions are set forth in the introduction to
this symposium.
bringing of the suspect before the judge shall be
effected "without delay" (the legal requirement
in Germany prior to 1950) or "within a reasonable
time," it is felt that the present German law, on
account of its lack of ambiguity, should be given
preference.
(2) Under German law the arrestee is entitled-
and should be entitled everywhere-to get in touch
with counsel immediately following his preliminary
arrest, and by all means prior to his first police
interrogation. The rights of counsel during this
stage of procedure, however, are, as was shown,
too restricted under German law and should be
broadened.
The legal and ethical rules to be respected by
prosecutor and counsel at this procedural stage
should be the same as in the subsequent court
proceedings, because the preliminary and the
subsequent court proceedings represent one organic
entity.
(3) A confession made by the defendant during
his illegal police detention should not-following
German law-be suppressed in principle, but only




A person arrested without a warrant must be
taken forthwith to the nearest police station, and
if the arrest was lawful, the officer in charge of the
police station takes that person into custody;
"otherwise, the arrested person shall be at once
released."' Where he is detained, he must be
brought before a magistrate within 48 hours of his
arrest; if he has not been brought before a magis-
trate within 48 hours, he must be released.2
A police officer of or above the rank of inspector
or specifically authorized in that behalf, may
examine orally any person, whether in custody or
not, who is supposed to be acquainted with the
facts or circumstances of any offence in respect of
which such officer is enquiring; the person so
* Justice, Supreme Court of Israel. Additional bio-
graphical data may be found in 51 J. Crim. L., C. &
P.S. 175 (1960).-EnnrOR.1CRumnNA PRocEDURE (ARES Am SEARcHs)
ORnINrANcE §§7 & 8, LAws OF PALESTIN cap. 33.21d., §10.
examined is bound to answer truly all questions
put to him by the officer, other than questions
the answer to which would have a tendency to
expose him to a criminal charge.3 Where, however,
a person makes a confession to have committed an
offence, such confession is not admissible in
evidence against him unless the prosecution has
adduced evidence to prove the circumstances in
which it was made and the trial judge is satisfied
that it was made freely and voluntarily. 4
The precaution invariably taken by the police
to ensure that the statement made by a person in
custody should be free and voluntary, is strict
compliance with the English Judges' Rules.5 Thus,
where a police officer has made up his mind that a
3 C~naNA PRocEDuRE (EVIDENCE) ORDiNAlcE §2,
LAws OF PALESTINE cap. 34.
4 EVIDENCE ORDINANCE §9, LAws OF PALESTINE
cap. 54.5ARCHBOiD's PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE
IN CRIMINAL CASES 422 (34th ed. 1959).
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person in custody is likely or liable to be charged
with an offence, he first cautions him that he is
not under any obligation to make a statement or
to say anything, but that any statement he may
choose to make will be taken down in writing and
may be given in evidence; and where that person
then expresses the desire to make a statement, he
is invited to do so in his own words, and may not
be cross-examined or asked questions except for
the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has
actually said. Although, in ordinary criminal
procedure, the Judges' Rules are not yet part of
the law of Israel (any more than they are partof
the law of England'), they were enacted in Israel
as binding law for military police investigations,7
and are to be incorporated in a new code of
criminal procedure which is at present in the
process of being drafted. But whether these Rules
are binding law or only rules for the guidance of
the police, it is well established that a court may
reject a confession as not freely or voluntarily
made, although the Judges' Rules were in fact
duly complied with, and a court may find a
confession to be free and voluntary although the
Judges' Rules have not in fact been complied with.8
The question whether a confession was free and
voluntary is a pure question of fact to be deter-
mined by the trial judge upon the evidence before
him, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of
any doubt remaining in the mind of the trial judge. 9
Although the requirement that it should be free
and voluntary applies under the statute only to
the "confession by the accused that he has com-
mitted an offence,"'" the courts in Israel have
always applied it to any statement made by the
accused while he was in police custody, the reason
being that if the prosecution produces such a
statement in evidence, presumably it produces it
for the purpose of incriminating the accused. The
rule would probably not be applied if such state-
ment were produced in evidence by the defence
(but no case is reported in which this question has
actually arisen).
Police interrogation of persons in custody is
6 Id. at 424.
7 MILITARY JURISDICTION ACT, 5715-1955, §§266-69,
reproduced in English in UNITED NATIoNs YEARBOOK
o; Hui ~N RIGHTS FOR 1955, at 142.8
MILITARY JURISDIcTION ACT, 5715-1955, §478;
Muflah v. Attorney-General, 3 Piskei Din 31 (1949).
9 Grossberger v. Attorney-General, 8 Piskei Din 182,
188 (1954).0 EvIDENCE ORDINANCE §9, LAWS OF PALESTINE
cap. 54.
conducted as a matter of course. When such
persons are brought before a magistrate, they are
sometimes heard to complain that although they
have been in police custody for two days already,
they have not once, or only once, been questioned;
on the other hand, it is a frequent occurrence that
magistrates are asked by the police for further
remands because it is desired to obtain a further
statement from the person in custody. In most
cases, however, in which a further remand is
asked for purposes of police interrogation, it is
because of apprehensions on the part of the
police that the person in custody might, if set at
liberty, interfere with or improperly influence
other witnesses or conceal or destroy material
evidence.
The question of the admissibility of a statement
made to the police while the person making the
statement was in unlawful custody, e.g. where the
48 hours' period had elapsed and he had not
been brought before a magistrate, has never arisen
.in Israel. It is submitted that the rules applying
to statements made in lawful custody, a fortiori
apply to statements made in unlawful custody;
but, apart from that, any unlawfulness of the
arrest or of the custody should have no direct
bearing upon the question whether the statement
was made freely and voluntarily-the less so as in
many cases the prisoner is not, at the time he
makes the statement, aware of the fact that he is
unlawfully detained, such unlawfulness deriving
not unfrequently from purely formal defects in
warrants of arrest. There are civil, criminal and
administrative remedies open to a person who
was unlawfully arrested or unlawfully detained,
but it is not one of those remedies that a statement
he made while in unlawful custody must for this
reason be rejected in limine.
On the other hand, the physical conditions under
which a person is detained, the time of the day or
night at which his statement is taken, the length
of time during which it was taken, or the number of
times it was asked of him-have all been held to
have a direct bearing upon the question whether
the statement was or was not free and voluntary.
Statements were rejected which were given four
hours after the person had first been cautioned and
refused to speakh; or which were given in the
middle of the night, whether after long hours of
interrogation or upon his being suddenly awakened
11 Attorney-General v. Aharonovitz, 10 Piskei Din
599, 604 (1956).
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out of his sleep.n The argument that all police
custody involves ipso facto some measure of
duress and that no confession made in such
custody should ever be admitted in evidence,1 3
would, if accepted, lead to most serious handicaps
in the administration of justice and does not
appear, at any rate as a generalisation, to be
justified on the facts. The only proper and just
method of proceeding would appear to be that
each statement be considered on its own merits,
according to the particular circumstances under
which, and the motives for which, it was actually
made.
The principle underlying the rejection of non-
voluntary confessions is that guch confessions are
likely to be untrue, whereas a voluntary confession
may reasonably be taken to be true, as no person
will wilfully make a statement against his interest.14
It is as well to bear in mind that the issue before
the court when considering the admission or
rejection of a statement made by a person in
custody, is not whether the police misconducted.
themselves and ought to be penalized, but solely
whether the statement as such is or is not reliable
and credible.
As to the right of persons in custody to have
the advice of counsel prior to their interrogation,
it is provided that any advocate charged with the
defence of an unconvicted prisoner may have
access to him on any day and at any reasonable
hour, care being taken that the prisoner may see
his legal advisers without the presence of any other
person. 5 The procedure followed is that the person
in custody notifies the officer in charge of the
prison or other place of detention, on a form to be
provided to him for that purpose, that he wishes
to see a certain advocate and charge him with his
defence; that advocate is then notified by the
police accordingly, and if he wishes to see the
person in custody, he is given the necessary
facilities. The same applies to an advocate charged
by friends or relatives of the arrested person with
his defence, provided the arrested person agrees
to execute a power of attorney for that advocate.
It happens very frequently that a person in
12 Goldstein v. Attorney-General, 10 Piskei Din 505,
545 (1956).
13 See, e.g., REPORT OF T SEmINAR ON PE RO-
TECTION OF Hum AN R Grrs IN Cnmrn-AL LAW AND
PRocznuR (U.N. Doc. ST/TAA/HI[/2). The seminar
was held in Baguio City, Philippines, in 1955.14 3 WiomoR, EvImENCE § §822-23 (3d ed. 1940).
I5 Rules 260 and 263, Prison Rules, 1925, as amended
in 1945.
custody refuses to make any statement to the
police so long as he has not seen a lawyer, in which
case his refusal is usually taken down in writing
to be signed by him, and often produced in evi-
dence at his trial. It has also happened that
persons in custody agreed to make a statement on
condition that their counsel be present, in which
case counsel is invited to be present, with the not
infrequent result that eventually, on counsel's
advice, no statement is forthcoming.
It is noteworthy, and at first sight alarming, that
in almost every major trial where it is sought to
produce in evidence a statement given to the
police by the accused while in custody, the defence
raises objection to the effect that the statement
was improperly obtained. The cases in which
those objections were upheld, are very rare; and
in the few cases in which such a statement was
rejected, it was not necessarily owing to any
proven misconduct on the part of the police, but
because of the trial judge's doubt whether the
statement was free and voluntary or perhaps
given under some misconception on the part of
the accused that there was some duty on him to
make it. As the law imposes on the prosecution the
burden to prove positively that any such statement
was made freely and voluntarily, there can not,
either legally or tactically, be any harm in putting
the prosecution to its proof; and it can easily
happen that a perfectly admissible statement is
rejected because the trial judge is not satisfied with
the quantum of proof adduced by the prosecution
as to the circumstances in which it was made, or
because the accused, testifying on his own behalf
(in what is known as the "little trial" on the admis-
sibility of the statement), succeeded in raising a
doubt in the judge's mind as to whether his evi-
dence or that of the police witness was to be
preferred. But even if the statement is held to be
admissible, the case of the accused has not in the
least been prejudiced by his false accusations
against the police (trial in Israel not being by
jury, but by professional judges only).
Nor is it considered unethical for a defence
lawyer to advise his client that the admission in
evidence of his statement should be contested. A
lawyer will advise his client on what grounds it
may be contested, and he.need not be suspected of
doing more than that; if his advice is dear and
intelligible, he will receive his instructions
promptly. It would, of course, be unethical for
the lawyer to suggest to his client a fabricated
1961]
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story; but not only persons with some experience
as defendants in criminal cases, but also readers of
trial accounts in newspapers, will be apt to do
their own fabricating and instruct their lawyers as
if in good faith. As a matter of conjecture it is
not unrealistic to assume that many of the stories
of police misconduct for the consumption of the
courts are concocted in prison, where the more
experienced veterans place their masterminds at
the service of the uninitiated. The damage unde-
servedly done to the reputation of the police force
in general, and the officers involved in particular,
by the publicity attending the "little" as all
trials, whatever their ultimate outcome, should
not pass unnoticed.
In the eyes of many a judge, the refusal to
make a statement to the police at the first oppor-
tunity, is some indication either that the accused
wished to conceal what he knew and did not
cooperate with the police, or that he had some
good reason not to make a statement. Considera-
tions of this kind have been held not to be suffi-
cient to corroborate other evidence, let alone to be
evidence in their own right; they cannot even,
standing alone, be sufficient reason to negative
the credibility of the accused as a witness; but it
is no use denying their existence. It is, therefore,
not surprising that many advocates encourage
their clients to make statements to the police
when asked to do so, even while in custody;
generally speaking, however, an advocate will not
advise a person in custody to make a statement or
to refuse to do so, until he himself has heard his
client's story. It is in any event entirely proper for
an advocate to advise his client not to make a
statement but to exercise his right to remain
silent.
Insofar as prosecuting counsel are concerned, it
is an unwritten rule that there should be no contact
between a person in custody and any member of
the prosecuting staff (other than police), except
upon the express request of the person in custody.
No statement of any person suspected of crime is
ever taken by prosecuting counsel, nor is any such
person ever interrogated by prosecuting counsel
except in court. Where the prosecution desires to
have a statement made to the police clarified or
amplified, police are instructed to request a further
statement from the person in custody, provided the
trial has not yet started. Any meeting between
prosecuting counsel and an accused person before
the trial, in the absence of the judge or of defending
counsel, even for purposes of a pre-trial conference,
would render the prosecutor liable to disciplinary
action (all prosecuting counsel in Israel are civil
servants). Similar rules apply to the contact
between prosecuting counsel and witnesses for
the defence, although the contact between counsel
for the defence and witnesses for the prosecution is
considered legitimate, so long as no attempt is
made to exercise undue influence upon them.
In conclusion, it should be noted that in Israel
even the full confession of the accused, although
found to have been made freely and voluntarily, is
not, if made out of court, sufficient to support a
conviction; there need not be corroborative
evidence, but the confession must be shown, by
some other evidence, to be at least probably true
and to fit in with the proven circumstances
surrounding the acts confessed to.18 No such
evidence is required to support a plea of guilty in
court; it is just another safeguard against illegal
police interrogation, superimposed by the judiciary
on the safeguards already provided for by the
legislature.
16 Anderlarsky v. Attorney-General, 2 Pesakim 87,
88 (1949).
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F. Japan*
HARUO ABEt
POLICE INTERROGATION SUBSEQUENT TO ARREST
AND PERMISSIBLE DELAY PRIOR TO
ARRAIGmNENT
Should the police be permitted an opportunity
to interrogate an arrested person prior to taking him
before a judicial officer for a hearing? If so, should
the provision for delay due to police interrogation
be general (e.g., a "reasonable time" or "without
unnecessary delay") or specific (e.g., four hours,
twelve hours, or twenty four hours)? The answer
depends upon how far one goes with idealism. If
the arrest should be regarded as the terminal of
criminal investigation or if the suspect should not
be regarded as evidential means, the right of the
police to interrogate the arrested person should be
denied. Again, if one insists that rigorous limitation
be placed on police interrogation, the permissible
delay should be prescribed by a general term with
very strict interpretation or by a specific term of a
few hours.
In Japan the statutes and practices have dealt
with this problem in a very realistic manner. In
conducting criminal investigations, most Japanese
investigators, whether the police or public prose-
cutors, are very anxious to obtain confessions
rather than circumstantial evidence. Consequently,
ordinary criminal investigators in Japan believe
that one of the most important functions of the
criminal investigator is to interrogate an arrested
person prior to taking him before a judicial officer.
The Japanese system of procedure subsequent to
arrest will not be well understood without a deep
insight into the psychological background of the
investigators.
In Japan the principal investigating agencies are
the police and the public prosecutors. They co-
operate and divide the work of investigation
between them; the former collect evidence in a
crude form, whereas the latter refine and supple-
ment it from a legal standpoint. When a suspect is
* The author gratefully acknowledges the encourage-
ment and advice of Professors Fred E. Inbau and
Claude R. Sowle in preparing this article for publica-
tion. The author also wishes to express his appreciation
to Miss Ruth E. McKee of the American Embassy,
Tokyo, who has been kind enough to refine the English
and give him valuable advice on linguistic matters.
t Public Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo.
Additional biographical data may be found in 51 J.
CaRi. L., C. & P.S. 178 (1960).-ErroR.
arrested by the police, he is usually taken to the
police station where he may be detained for 48
hours from the time of arrest. During the period
of 48 hours the police may interrogate him from
time to time; if he confesses, the confession may
be reduced to a written statement.' It is unlawful
for the police to detain him beyond this limit. If
the police need to detain an arrested suspect
longer, they must take him to a public prosecutor
within 48 hours from the time of arrest together
with evidence showing reasonable grounds to
support the suspicion of guilt.2 Otherwise the
police must release the suspect at the expiration
of the 48 hours period.
The public prosecutor who receives the suspect
must immediately inform him of the charges
against him and of his right to counsel and give
him an opportunity for explanation.3 The public
prosecutor makes investigation, usually by
questioning the suspect and other persons, to
obtain further evidence supporting the suspicion
of guilt. His major reliance upon personal evidence,
however, does not mean that he pays little atten-
tion to physical or real evidence. If the public
prosecutor believes that the grounds for detention
of the suspect are reasonable, he shall within 24
hours from the time of receiving the suspect
request a judge to issue a warrant for detention.4
If he fails to make the request within the prescribed
period or if the judge does not issue -a warrant
upon the request, the prosecutor is obliged to
release the suspect, unless during the same period
he institutes a prosecution by filing a written
information against the suspect.5 Thus the total
period during which the investigators may interro-
gate the suspects without a warrant fordetention
may be at most 72 hours from the time 6f arrest.6
However, this does not mean that the police have
free rein to interrogate around the clock during
the period.
The judge who has been requested to issue a
warrant for detention shall hear the suspect and
'CODE OF CRMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 198 (1948).
Id., arts. 203, 204.
Id., art. 205.
4 Id., art. 205.
Id., art. 205.
Id., art. 205, par. 2.
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decide on the necessity and ground for detention.7
The hearing is dosed to the public. The period of
detention secured by a warrant of detention is no
longer than ten days." However, the judge may
extend it at the request of the public prosecutor.
The total period of such extension should not
exceed ten days9 except that, when certain serious
crimes are involved, an additional extension
period not exceeding five days is permissible.10
The public prosecutor is required to carry out the
investigation within this period" and to decide
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
support the prosecution of the detained suspect.
If the prosecutor is convinced of the guilt of the
suspect, he may file a written information with the
court to open prosecution. The suspect has no
right to be released on bail during this detention
period unless and until a prosecution be instituted
against him.
Recently a minority of progressive lawyers has
been criticizing the present statutes for allowing
investigators too much freedom. Clearly influenced
by the development of the confession rule in Ameri-
can federal courts, these lawyers contend that the
7 Id., art. 207.
8 Id., art. 208, par. 1.
9 Id., art. 208, par. 2.
loId., art. 208a. This provision was newly adopted
in 1953. So far, no such additional detention has been
requested or permitted under this new provision.
1 The following table, constructed from the data
published in Mn4IsTRY OF JUSTICE, THE 84m AnUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION FOR
1958 (1959), shows the number of persons received by
all public prosecutor's offices in 1958 and detained for
various periods for investigation. Where a suspect is
detained more than once, his detention period is calcu-
lated as the total of those detentions.
72 hours delay legalized under the Japanese system
is dearly improper. The opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in the Mallory case13 and
the dissenting opinion of Edgerton, C. J., in the
Netoyer case, 14 seem to encourage the radical
views of the lawyers who doubt the lawfulness of
such statutes and practices as allowing the deten-
tion to be used for criminal interrogation.
However, such extremely idealistic views are
not popular among the majority of Japanese
lawyers who find in the present statutes a practical
compromise between idealism and realism. The
author is inclined to support the popular view for
the following five reasons:
(1) At the present stage of scientific criminal
investigation confession is still one of the
most important sources of evidence;
(2) Japanese judges are reluctant to convict an
accused upon circumstantial evidence;
(3) Under the Japanese substantive criminal
laws, where rules of presumption have very
limited room to function, it is highly
difficult to prove mens rea of the accused;
(4) The public prosecutor in Japan must make
a "quasijudicial" decision in that he has to
be well convinced by the evidence supporting
the probable conviction of the accused
before he decides to institute a prosecution;
(5) In Japan, people expect the public prosecu-
tion to maintain a very low "not guilty"
rate (less than 1%).15 If the prosecution
made it the rule to prosecute suspects upon
prima facie evidence and raised the "not
guilty rate" over 1%, the prosecution
Prosecuted
Detention Period Not Prosecuted Others Total
Trial Non-Trial
Not detained .............. 40,919 184,490 292,453 140,326 658,188
Within 5 days ............. 9,171 4,908 6,325 2,177 22,581
Within 10 days ............ 54,616 18,246 26,997 13,206 113,065
Within 15 days ............ 5,859 975 2,214 857 9,905
Within 20 days ............ 14,985 1,169 4,562 1,948 22,664
Over 20 days .............. 411 28 57 21 517
Total ................... 125,961 209,816 332,608 158,535 826,920
12 Cf. Abe, Jihaku ni kansuru Ribeihojo no Shogensoku
(Anglo-American Rides on Confession), KxISATSU
KENKu (The Police Studies) Vol. 29, No. 8, p. 15;
Id., Vol. 29, No. 10, p.3; Vol. 29, No. 11, p.4 5 (1958);
Id., Vol. 30, No. 1, p.96; Vol. 30, No. 6, p.2 9 (1959)
(a comparative analysis of the development of the
confession rule from the standpoint of a Japanese
lawyer).
would be severely criticized by public
opinion and the legislature.
11 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
14 Netoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
15 The following table shows the "not guilty" rates
in recent years in Japan.
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Whbt is stated above does not mean that we| J
should be content with the unsatisfactory reality 6
On the contrary, the author agrees with the
contention of Professor Kaino, one of the most
progressive scholars in Japan, who wisely sug-
gested that we should be able to reach the ideal of
criminal justice only through a painful period in
whic7 sly criminals escape justice wholly unpun-
ished i and that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, though seemingly obstructive, has a
disciplinary effect on the development of scientific
THE NUMBER or THE AccusED PRONOUNCED "NoT
GU-ITY" ArTER FoinmA TRIAL IN = CoURTS
or FinsT INSTANCE
Defendants Finally
Year Adjudicated in Ordinary Not Guilty* %
Courts of First Instance
1953 115,354 1,202 1.0
1954 109,696 869 0.8
1955 124,037 925 0.7
1956 124,179 710 0.6
1957 106,351 566 0.5
Total 579,617 4,272 0.72
SDefendants pronounced "not guilty" do not com-
prise those who were excused from punishment or
acquitted because of statutes of limitation, etc. See
Abe, The Role of Public Prosecutors in a Modern Sociey,
in KAmo (ed.), SAIBAN (Trial) 115, 116 (1959) (in
Japanese).
16 Cf., Abe, The Role of Public Prosecutors in a Modern
Socidy, in KAiNo (ed.), SAiBAN (Trial) 115, 129 (1959)
(in Japanese). In this article the author pointed out as
follows: "It is the tradition of placing too much empha-
sis upon confession which is hampering the growth of
this scientific spirit. In Japan it appears that the police,
public prosecutors, and the judges are very fond of
confessions. Among the police there are still those who
regard a "fist" as the best lie-detector. It is a shame
that a distinguished public prosecutor should give hell
to the suspect in order to obtain a confession. Amongjudges there are those who do not like to pronounce
"guilty" except upon confession. In the technical
terminology of criminal investigation, to force the ac-
cused to confess is called to make him 'break down.'
Today, a good many people still think that a good
criminal investigator is a person who is skilled in making
a suspect 'break down' (i.e., compelling hind to talk in
exhaustion). If every one depends upon confession,
criminal investigation does not grow up. It is true that
forcing to confess is an easier and more convenient
method than gathering physical evidence by walking
around. But unless one decides to give up obtaining
confession and rely on physical evidence, the moderni-
zation of criminal investigation cannot be expected. To
abstain from self-incriminating evidence and to give up
obtaining confession may result in temporary ineffi-
ciency of investigation, but the prosecution and the
police will not mature without going through this
thorny path."
i
and circumstantial investigations.17 However, the
author believes that the ideal should be reached
step by step. The first step should be to train the
police in I scientific and civilized techniques of
criminal interrogation rather than to prohibit
the policel from depending on the confession of the
suspect. For this purpose the use of the "poly-
graph,"18 for example, is highly recommended.
There are many Japanese cases in which the timely
use of thet polygraph has led to successful investi-
gation. 9 I n a few cases Japanese courts have used
polygraph records in weighing the trustworthiness
of the defendant's testimony 2 0
THE RIG T oF THE ARRESTED PERSON TO COUNSEL
Right to Counsel in General
The Constitution of Japan guarantees the right
of the accused" and the arrested person to
counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifi-
cally provides for the privileges of the arrested
17 See Abe, Self-Incrimination-Japan and the United
States, 46 J. Cdn. L., C. & P.S. 613, 624 (1956).
Is It appears that techniques and devices of polyg-
raphy in Japan have been greatly improved by Mr.
Yoshimasa Imamura and his colleagues in Scientific
Police Research Institute. One of the characteristics of
the Japanese lie-detector is its sensitivity to galvanic
skin reflex. For the development of He-detection tech-
niques in Japan see Imamura et al., Development of Lie-
detection Techniques in Japan, 11 SCIENCE AND CRIM
DETECTION, (No. 2) 228 (1958) (in Japanese).
19 It is reported that from May, 1956, to July, 1959,
1,211 cases were tested by means of the polygraph.
Data of polygraphic experiments are collected in series
of publications (in Japanese) by The Scientific Police
Research Institute.20 Decision of the Kyoto District Court, Fukuchi-
yama Branch, March 5, 1959 (prosecution for larceny;
polygraphic records received); decision of the Chiba
District Court, Yokaichi Branch, May 28, 1958 (prose-
cution for rape-murder; polygraphic records received).
2 1 
THE CoNsTITUTIoN or JAPAN, art. 37, par. 3: "At
all times the accused shall have the assistance of com-
petent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to
secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his
use by the State." The original Japanese term for
"the accused" is "keiji hikokunin" which literally means
"criminal defendant." The wQrd "the accused" being
used in the official translation is, therefore, inaccurate
and misleading, because the word "accused" may im-
ply also the status of a person who has been accused
but not yet formally indicted. In Japanese legal termi-
nology "keiji hikokunin" or "the criminal defendant"
does not include "higisha" or "the suspect" which
means one who has been investigated but not yet for-
mally prosecuted by a written indictment (or more
exactly a written "information").
2 Id., art. 34: "No person shall be arrested or de-
tained without being at once informed of the charges
against him or without. 1he immediate privilege of
counsel ......
CODE OF CuRueAL PROCEDURE, art. 30 (right of
defendant, suspect and their relatives to assign the
counsel); arts. 203, 204 (mandatory requirement of in-
forming the arrested person of the right to counsel).
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person to counsel. According to the provisions of
the law, an arrested person is entitled to counsel
prior to the hearing before the detention judge,
whereas he has no right to the public counsel to
be appointed by the court unless and until prose-
cution be formally instituted against him.
Communication Between Counsel and Arrestee and
Its Restrictions
The principle of free communication between
counsel and arrestee is statutorily established in
Japan.2 4 Counsel may communicate with and
personally interview an arrested person without
being monitored or having any one present.25
There are two major exceptions to the principle.
In the first place, it is provided that certain
measures may be prescribed by law or the rules of
the Court to prevent the escape of the arrested
person or the destruction of evidence. 6 Thus far,
however, no such restrictions have ever been
prescribed except for the case where the arrested
person is on the premises of a court.? Secondly,
investigating officials may designate the date,
place and time of interview, if such designation is
necessary for investigation and only if it is made
prior to the opening of the public prosecution.3
Despite the proviso warning "that such designa-
tion should not unreasonably restrict the right of
24 Id., art. 39. It should be noted that the restriction
of communication and interview by the order of the
court under article 80 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure does not extend to the privilege of counsel to
communicate with or interview an arrested person. For
the translation of article 81, see note 29, infra.
25 Id., art. 39, par. 1: "The accused or the suspect
placed under physical restraint in any way may, with-
out having any official bystander present, have an
interview with his defense counsel or any other person
who is going to be his defense counsel upon request of
the person who is entitled to appoint defense counsel
... and may deliver or receive any documents or any
other thing."
26 Id., art. 39, par. 2: "With regard to the interview
and delivery or receipt of things prescribed in the pre-
ceding paragraph, such measures may be provided by
law or ordinance (including the Rules of the Court; the
same shall apply hereinafter) as are necessary for pre-
venting the escape of the accused or the suspect, the
destruction or concealment of evidence, or the delivery
or receipt of those things which may hinder 'the safe
custody of the accused or the suspect."
27 THE RUEs Or THE SnPP.xaR COURT, art. 30.
28 CODE OF C26nINAL PROCEDURE, art. 30, par. 3:
"The public prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant
officer and judidal police official... may, when it is
necessary for investigation, designate the date, place
and time of interview and delivery or receipt of things
mentioned in Paragraph 1 only prior to the opening of
public prosecution, provided that such designation
should not unreasonably restrict the right of the suspect
to prepare for his own defense."
the suspect to prepare for defense," Japanese
investigators are prone to utilize this privilege of
designation to the extremity. In certain cases
involving election law violation, bribery or
racketeering, investigators often feel the necessity
of restricting free communication between the
arrested person and outside people. In such cases
investigators ask the court to issue an order to
restrain free communication between the arrestees
and outside persons other than the counsel. 2
9
But since this order does not restrain the approach
of the counsel to arrestees, public prosecutors
usually attempt to go one step further by invoking
the provision authorizing investigators to designate
the time and place for interviewing.
The degree to which public prosecutors utilize
the privilege of restraining the interview varies
from place to place30 and from case to case. In
small or middle-sized towns, where there is no
perceivable tension between defense lawyers and
investigators, public prosecutors seldom use this
privilege of restriction. However, in large cities,
such as Tokyo or Osaka, where there is some
tension between defense counsel and criminal
investigators, public prosecutors frequently use
their privilege. Should the public prosecutor,
for example, invoke this privilege in a case involv-
ing election law violation in Tokyo, the average
practice would be as follows: During the ten day
period of detention a defense lawyer would be
permitted to interview the arrestee only once. If
the detention were to be extended beyond the ten
day limit, he would be entitled to see his client
once more. This means that an arrested person
may personally communicate with his counsel six
29 Id., art. 81: "When there is reasonable ground to
suspect that the accused under detention may escape
or destroy evidence, a court may, upon request of a
public prosecutor or on its own initiative, forbid him
interview with other persons than those prescribed in
Art. 39, Par. 1, examine documents and other things
he may deliver to or receive from such persons, forbid
him to deliver or receive them, or seize them. However,
he shall not be forbidden to receive food nor shall it be
seized."
10 It was reported that out of 10,808 suspects, for
whom detention was requested by the Tokyo District
Public Prosecutors' Office from January to June, 1951,
821 (or about 7.6%) were those against whom orders to
forbid the interview with outside people (except their
counsel) were issued by the court. There were, however,
many districts where the percentage of the issuance of
such orders was less than 1%. For details see MINISTRY
OF JusnicE, Csn-NAL ArAms BUREAU, A SuRVEY
oF THE ADnmImsTRATION or =x CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND IE SUGGESTIONS TO ITS AMENDMENTS
(Materials on Prosecution, No. 33) 83 et seq. (1952)
(in Japanese).
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times during a 20 day detention period if he has
three defense lawyers. In cases where a designation
of date for interview is made, the average time for
one interview is usually about 15 to 20 minutes.
The practice of restraining interview has
naturally been arousing considerable feeling of
dissatisfaction among progressive lawyers.3' Some
bar associations have passed resolutions requesting
public prosecutors to exercise within reasonable
limits their privilege of restraining interview.
The Federation of Japanese Bar Associations also
made a declaration urging investigators not to
abuse their privilege of restraining interview.
Thus far, there have been only a few Supreme
Court decisions regarding the legitimate limitation
of the investigator's privilege of restraining inter-
view.P They indicate that the Supreme Court has
been rather reluctant to handcuff investigators in
exercising this privilege.
It should be noted that the law4 provides for
the recourse to a judicial remedy in the form of
'jun kokoku" (quasi minor-appeal) to the court.
This quasi appeal may be taken by a person who is
not content with the restraining measure taken by
investigators for hampering the interview between
counsel and arrestee. It is reported that recently a
few progressive lawyers took recourse to this
provision. But no cases have ever been reported
where the measures taken by investigators were
set aside by the court. The proper solution of this
problem seems to be not in judicial control but in
the sense of humanity existing in the minds of
criminal investigators.
Ethics of Counsel Concerning Free Communication
with an Arrestee
To destroy or conceal evidence in criminal cases
of others constitutes a crime under the Japanese
Penal Code.35 If a defense counsel instigates or
helps an arrestee to destroy or conceal evidence,
the counsel is punishable under the Code. Investi-
gators sometimes complain that there are cases,
31 See, e.g., Ozu, Improper Restrictions on the Interiew
of Counsel with the Accused or the Suspect, 51 JUPIST
14 (1954) (in Japanese).
1 Id. at 17.
n3 Vol. 7, No. 7 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1474 (2d Petty
Bench 1953), prosecution for bribery, four times of
interview in a few minutes each held "improper"
(dictum); Decision of the Supreme Court (2d Petty
Bench, April 20, 1955) designation of the date of inter-
view on the very day when the accused was indicted,
held not necessarily unlawful.31CODE O CRIiIIWAL PROCEDURE, art. 430.35 PENAL CODE or JAPAN, art. 104.
though very few, where defense counsel instigate
or help arrestees to obstruct investigation. 36
However, since the communication between
counsel and arrestee is not monitored, it is impos-
sible to ascertain whether such complaints are
true or not. The key to securing fairness on the
part of counsel in free and secret communication
between counsel and arrestees must be sought
in the ethiks of lawyers and the mutual trust
between counsel and investigators. The days
when the arrestees were detained incommunicado
have passed. But the .days of sound practice of
free communication being established upon the
mutual trust between counsel and investigators
will not come very soon.
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR AN ACCUSED PERSON WHO
CONFESSED DURING AN ILLEGAL DETENTION
PERIOD
What legal remedies should be available to an
accused person who confessed to a crime during a
period of police detention which extended beyond
prescribed limits? Should he be entitled to have
the confession suppressed?
These questions seem to be somewhat academic
to Japanese lawyers because in practice there has
been (and perhaps "there will be") no actual case
where a Japanese prosecutor has ever attempted to
introduce in evidence a confession which was
obtained during a period of. detention which
extended beyond prescribed limits.
However, there was a; -case where the admissi-
bility of a confession obtained by. a police officer
during an illegal detention was in. question.u
In this case the Supreme Court held that the
written confession should not be-regarded simply
as null and void even if it had been made during
an illegal detention. In another case, where the
time of counsel's interview with the suspect under
police detention was limited to two or three
minutes and the admissibility of the coifession
36 Several cases in which defense lawyers appeared
to abuse their privilege of free communication with the
arrestees are reported in MINISsx oF JusTicE, CRMnr-
NAL APAnS BUREAU, A SuRvEY or =, ADmIisTRA-
nON Or THE CODE OF CMqAL PaocEDuRE AD =E
SuGGEsToNs To ITs AENDmENTs (Materials on Prose-
cution, No. 33) 56 et seq. (1952) (in Japanese). Also
see Ozu, op. cit. supra note 31, at 16, reporting five
cases in which counsel allegedly abuse their right to
free communication as experienced by Mr. Okazaki,
during his 3 years and 7 months activities as a public
prosecutor in Tokyo.
"IVol. 6, No. 10 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1245 (3d
Petty Bench 1952).
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made during the detention was challenged, the
Court held that the confession was admissible
because the illegality of the interview procedure
did not affect the voluntariness of the confession."
From these precedents it may be inferred that the
Supreme Court of "Japan has been taking the
position that "voluntariness" is the sole or most
important criterion for the admissibility of a
confession. In, some cases a detention beyond
prescribed limits may psychologically distort the
voluntariness of a confession, but illegal extension
of detention does not logically insure the involun-
tariness of a confession obtained during illegally
prolonged detention. Under the Japanese system
a confession obtained during "unreasonably
38 Vol. 7, No. 7 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1474 (2d Petty
Bench 1953).
G.N
prolonged" detention is presumed to be involun-
tary and inadmissible; 39 but a detention extended
beyond prescribed limits does not necessarily
mean "unreasonably prolonged" detention, unless
the extension be made for such a long period as to
have a torturing effect upon the detained person. 0
Most judges and public prosecutors seem to agree
with the position of the Supreme Court, but
majority opinion among scholars and private
lawyers appears to be against the position of the
Court. The author also favors this latter opinion.
S9THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, art. 38, par. 2;
CODE or CminNAL PRocEnunE, art. 319, par. 1.40There is a case where the Supreme Court held
that a confession based upon another confession which
had been made in a preliminary hearing after more than
40 days detention was not a "confession made after
prolonged detention." Vol. 2, No. 10 Sup. Ct. Crim.
Rep. 1209 (2d Petty Bench 1948).
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ANDERS BRATHOLM*
In Norway the police have power to question a
witness or a suspected person. But neither the
witness nor the suspected person has any duty
to make a statement, apart from giving his name,
address and position.'
If a witness chooses to make a statement to the
police, he is obliged to tell the truth, if he can do so
without exposing himself or one of his relatives to
danger of being punished or losing the respect of
his fellow citizens. 2 A suspect can, however, without
penalty make a false statement.
If the questioning implies that the witness is
suspected of the crime in question, he is in the same
legal position as an expressly suspected person and
can, accordingly, make a false statement without
risking being held criminally responsible.
The police have no duty to draw the attention
of a suspect to the fact that he need not make a
statement or that everything he says may be
taken down and used as evidence against him.
On the contrary, if the suspect declines to make a
statement, the examining officer can draw his
attention to the fact that his refusal could be
considered as a circumstance which weighs against
* Professor of Law, University of Oslo. Additional
biographical data may be found in 51 J. Cgim. L.,
C. & P.S. 186 (1960).-EITOR.
' CRUmA, CODE OF 1902, §§167, 333.
2Id., §167(2).
him. The same applies if the accused refuses to
make a statement in court.3
As far as witnesses are concerned, it is laid
down in the regulations for the Public Prosecuting
Authority that the police shall inform a witness,
who is not obliged to give a statement on ground of
his relationship to the suspect, about his right in
this respect. Otherwise, the police have no duty to
inform the witness about his right to decline to
answer questions.
It is made clear in the Criminal Procedure Act,
and in the regulations which apply to the police,
that no form of pressure must be brought to bear
on a person being questioned.4 There are, however,
few regulations as to how the questioning shall
take place. But it is understood that the question-
ing cannot be carried out under such conditions, or
last so long, that the interrogated person is exposed
to undue strain. To question him at night or for
many hours without a pause, would in most cases
be considered impermissible. It happens, however,
in practice, especially in serious cases, that sus-
pected persons have to undergo somewhat long
and exhausting questioning, but really over-
whelming strain is avoided. A confession obtained
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as a result of improper questioning will, as a rule,
be admitted in evidence.5
The statement of a suspected person (or a
witness) to the police is, as a rule, taken down and
read over to him, and, in most cases, signed by him.
It is generally held that Section 332 of the
Criminal Procedure Act does not permit the
reading in court of the statement of the accused
to the police, but in practice this interdiction has
been of little significance. As a rule the police
officer who took down the statement will give
evidence in court with respect to what the accused
told him. In this connection, the officer usually
reads through the statement just before he enters
the courtroom.'
* The accused person has the opportunity to have
counsel in attendance during police questioning,
but it is seldom that this happens in practice in
any case during the time before or just after his
arrest.7
A person who is arrested must, if at all possible,
be brought before an examining judge within the
5 See B RPoLM, XoRmisK TinssEmFT FOR RETTS-
VITENSKAP (NoRTEaRN JOURNAL OF LAW) 109 (1959).6Andenaes contends, and supports his contention
with very convincing arguments, that the CPA can
reasonably be interpreted in such a way that the police
report in most cases can be read in court as a supple-
ment to the oral statement of the officer. See his article
in PotL IEmBEDsm xNENIs BrAD (Tm JoURNAL OF
PoucE OFncLus) 149, 158 (1958).T SeeBRATaoLiPAAGRiPELSE oG VAETEKTSFnNGSEL
(ARRs Am DETENTION BEFORE TsAmx) 92, 263-64
(Oslo 1957).
end of the day after his arrest, if the police have
not set him at liberty within this time.8 Strictly
speaking he should be brought before a magistrate
at the earliest possible opportunity, and at the
latest within the next day. But in practice it is
seldom that his appearance before the court takes
place before about 24 hours have passed.9
While the accused person is in custody, he is
more or less frequently questioned by the police,
either in prison or at the police station. The
accused can iefuse such questioning, but in practice
it seldom happens that he does so. A refusal
would in most cases worsen his position."0 Ques-
tioning both before and after remand in custody
can take place without witnesses. According to
Swedish law, a witness must be present, if at all
possible, during the police questioning." A police-
man can serve as a witness.
8 CPA, §§235, 236.,
9 Sometimes the time limit is exceeded without a
valid reason. See BRATaoLm, op. cit. supra note 7, at
263. Evidence, or a confession, obtained during such a
period, is -ialid. A survey of the arrest and remand
provisions in CPA is given in 51 J. CiR L., C. &
P.S. 437 (1960). A more detailed survey may be found
in the author's article, Arrest and Detention in Norway,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 336 (1960).
10 If it turns out that the remanded (or prosecuted)
person was innocent, he is, as a rule, entitled to com-
pensation by the State for economic loss caused by his
imprisonment (or by the prosecution). Such a claim is
in first instance generally decided upon by the Magis-
trate's Court. CPA, §469-71.
n THE SWEDISH P ocEDuRE AcT Or 1942, c. 23, §10.
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